IA and Diplomacy:

International relations in the era of disruptive technologies

SELA
LATIN AMERICAN
AND CARIBBEAN
ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Artificial Intelligence and Diplomacy:
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FOREWORD

The Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), in its training process for academics, diplomats and high-level officials in areas related to diplomacy, technology, cyberspace governance and topics related to artificial intelligence (AI), framed in the Work Programme for 2022-2026 of the organisation, presents this publication with the aim of promoting and continuing to foster the development of negotiating skills for a better understanding of the implementation of diplomacy in the political, economic and social situation that arises in cyberspace.

In July 2024, SELA, in alliance with the European Institute of International Studies and with the collaboration of the Pontifical University of Salamanca, conducted courses on "Artificial intelligence and diplomacy: International relations in the era of disruptive technologies" and "European Union - Latin America and the Caribbean relations in the digital era: EU-LAC Digital Alliance and Global Gateway." In this way, SELA contributes substantially to the field of diplomacy by offering advanced tools and capabilities to analyse data, predict trends, facilitate decision-making and improve efficiency in negotiations in a global scenario that is constantly changing, evolving and becoming more and more challenging.

For SELA, capacity building for the regional public sector is a constant on our agenda, especially now that the world of international relations is in a state of constant transformation,

driven by the rise of new technologies such as AI; a tool with the potential to revolutionise various aspects of diplomacy, from the way data is collected and analysed to the way negotiations are conducted.

As diplomacy is the conduit par excellence for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the promotion of peace and international cooperation, particularly in the face of new challenges on the global stage, it is essential that foreign ministries, intergovernmental institutions, academia and universities provide society with professional tools that enable them to adapt to the new global dynamics. AI can help diplomats better understand geopolitical dynamics, identify opportunities for collaboration and address conflicts more effectively.

Undoubtedly, the use of AI calls on countries to rethink their international relations, foreign policy priorities and diplomacy. We must be prepared to take on these challenges and opportunities. International discourse increasingly points to the need to take advantage of more structured and practical implementation of AI so that governments and civil society focus on its improvement and proper uses.

Development cooperation in the field of AI clearly cannot be isolated from international political dynamics. Today, AI has become an essential component of the international development agenda, presenting both challenges and opportunities. While international cooperation in AI projects is advancing, it is crucial to consider and address the global political dynamics that shape its implementation.

For SELA, knowing and understanding what is happening in the world is a responsibility of which we must all be aware; developing policies appropriate to the current and future world, as well as implementing a foreign policy with third countries, at bilateral, regional, intra-regional and multilateral levels, is the responsibility of ourselves and the foreign services of each

country.

From this perspective, this publication includes the relationship between Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union, which has been marked by historical, cultural and economic ties with a long history of cooperation and exchange, in which common values and interests have been shared, such as democracy, human rights, sustainable development, the joint fight against climate change, the promotion of social development and the protection of the environment. And this is where SELA has wanted to strengthen this relationship, detecting areas of opportunity and improvement for the benefit of our region.

Both regions have recognised the importance of strengthening their digital cooperation to foster sustainable development and shared prosperity. In this context, we have seen the launch of projects such as the EU-LAC Digital Alliance and the Global Gateway, which could strengthen the relationship between the two blocs. These initiatives are strategic to boost and deepen collaboration and move towards a joint inclusive digital agenda around governance, data protection, good governance, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, among others.

Both the EU-LAC Digital Alliance and the Global Gateway represent an important step towards a closer and more strategic relationship between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, with a joint focus on digital transformation that will bridge the digital divide, boost innovation, and move towards a more prosperous, sustainable and inclusive future.

In view of the above, SELA takes a leading role in imparting knowledge based on the benefits of the use of AI in international relations, so that it can encourage the development of our region. AI-related processes have much to contribute to the analysis of the implications and potential of these technol-

ogies, hand in hand with the private sector and civil society.

This publication is an effort by SELA that seeks to provide valuable support to strengthen and redefine diplomacy strategies in the face of the ongoing global challenges. From the Permanent Secretariat, I would like to express my gratitude to the authors for the preparation of this publication, which will be useful to continue promoting new projects that include the use of artificial intelligence in international relations and the development of a more prosperous and inclusive region.

Ambassador Clarems Endara
Permanent Secretary
Latin American and Caribbean
Economic System (SELA)

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A WORLD FOR DIPLOMATS

José Beraun Araníbar
Ambassador and President
European Institute of International Studies

I would like to start by asking where the world is now and what vision we can and should have in order to understand it from different aspects, be it from a moral, economic, political or diplomatic point of view.

At this point I would like to refer to a recent article published by Thomas Friedman in the New York Times on Saturday 29 June 2024. In this article, Friedman wrote: "this is not just any inflection point in history at which we find ourselves. We are at the beginning of the greatest technological and climatic disruptions in human history. We are at the dawn of an artificial intelligence revolution that will change EVERYTHING FOR EVERYONE: how we work, how we learn, how we teach, how we trade, how we invent, how we collaborate, how we wage war, how we commit crime, and how we fight crime."

If ever there was a time when the world needed leadership grounded in an understanding of the opportunities and challenges before us, it is now. While we may not be fully aware that this revolution affects us all, I must mention that knowing, understanding and learning more about artificial intelligence and disruptive technologies in the international system has be-

come imperative.

In today's digital age, cyberspace has become one of the main fields of action for governments, public institutions, businesses, civil society and citizens.

Large technology companies, mainly North American and Chinese, have led and govern the digital age. The economic power derived from the use of artificial intelligence to produce goods and services has geopolitical implications, the main one being to transform these large companies into global players in the international system.

Artificial intelligence is having an impact on sectors such as transport, banking and finance, education and health, to name a few. It therefore modifies traditional economic, financial and commercial systems, but not only. It also influences and affects the political systems of countries. Information and disinformation campaigns, the alteration of electoral processes, actions that lead to the change or overthrow of governments, all managed with artificial intelligence, illustrate this.

For a better understanding, it is necessary to see and appreciate **the international system of the present century**.

In this respect, we live in an international system defined primarily, but not exclusively, **by uncertainty about the existing order and its future direction**. It is not only the emergence of new global players such as the big technology companies but, at the country level, competition has increased for global power, with the United States, the People's Republic of China and, to a lesser extent, India as the main players. The Russian Federation could be added, not so much for its economic strength but for its nuclear arsenal and its ability to pressure the United States beyond its aggression in Ukraine and in different non-European scenarios. This is demonstrated by the Russian Federation's rapprochement and alliance with the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea. Also, due to the increased growth of national power in some countries and the establish-

ment of growing interdependence among States, changes in the balance of power are accelerating, and understanding the dynamics and direction of international relations is becoming increasingly complex. In this context, competition between the most powerful States in the political, economic and military spheres has emerged prominently, with the intention of shaping or reshaping an international and regional order in their own image and for their own benefit, thereby increasing their global influence. Artificial intelligence is playing a substantive role in the process.

A second element we see in the international system is that **the international order based on fundamental values**, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and respect for international law, which underpinned the stability and prosperity of much of the world in the 20th century, is being challenged by attempts to unilaterally change the status quo through the use of information and disinformation, the spread of political and/or violent extremism and also through force and/or coercion. All this also with the involvement of artificial intelligence.

A third element we see is **the role of technology in communication and decision-making**. The rapid expansion of social media and Internet access has enabled governments and international organisations to communicate more quickly and efficiently. Digital platforms have given diplomats the ability to interact directly with the public and to disseminate their message more broadly. In addition, technological transformation that may bring fundamental changes to the nature of society and the way people live, such as the Internet of Things, robotics, artificial intelligence and quantum technology, means that international competition for technological superiority is becoming more intense, and these technologies are increasingly being used as tools to gain more power.

Technology has also posed new challenges in the diplomatic arena. Cybersecurity has become a key concern, as cyber-at-

tacks can have a significant impact on international relations. Governments and international organisations must develop robust strategies to protect their information and ensure the integrity of their systems.

In this scenario, it becomes important and necessary to lead a fair and balanced digital transition. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as those of the European Union, are aware of this need and share this challenge.

The last EU-CELAC summit in 2023 highlighted the importance of cooperating to promote a responsible, people-centred model of digital transformation based on inclusive values that protects privacy as a fundamental right, increases digital connectivity and cybersecurity, aims to close digital divides, fosters the development and reliable use of artificial intelligence, and contributes to building trust in the digital economy.

The summit also recognised the potential contribution of the EU-LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda, which will address investment gaps in line with the common priorities of the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean, with the aim of mobilising both private capital and public finance for sustainable development, including digital transformation.

A fourth element we see in the international system in this century is the **diversification and complexity of threats**. The security environment has become more complex. Today, there is a high degree of global interconnectedness, which means that countries are more connected than ever before in terms of economics, communications, transport and culture, just to mention a few examples.

We see scenarios that illustrate this new situation, such as "hybrid warfare," which attempts to blur the boundaries between military and non-military spheres, and interference in democracy by foreign countries and/or forces through the manipulation of information, testify to the serious challenges we are currently facing.

A fifth element we see in the international system is the **global economic trends, the emergence of protectionist trends and national retrenchment**. The development of global supply chains and financial systems in line with advances in globalisation and innovation, such as digital technology, has reinforced interdependence in terms of the global world economy more than ever before. This creates greater opportunities for growth, but also allows regional economic crises, fluctuations in commodity prices or other factors to impact on other regions and the world economy at the same time. In addition, innovative developments in information and communication technologies within the framework of the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution - represented by artificial intelligence, robotics and BIG DATA - will put pressure on the international economic order to further transform itself by drastically changing all aspects of people's lives.

There are various reasons for the protectionist and national retrenchment trends, such as growing inequality in domestic incomes, job losses, import growth and increasing numbers of immigrants, as well as global environmental problems. The economic gap between North and South persists and remains unresolved. At the political level, the emergence of political parties and ideologies that use these same elements to explain and justify populist and nationalist policies are increasingly gaining acceptance and support among citizens.

Finally, we see in the international system in the current century a **growing concern for the global issues facing the international community. Issues such as climate change, armed conflict and migration** have required greater cooperation and coordination among nations and thus among diplomatic actors. International agreements, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change, are examples of how countries have worked together to address urgent problems and find common solutions.

The international community has made numerous efforts to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger in the world through ini-

tiatives based on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000. The progress achieved with the MDGs was substantial. By 2015, the world would have met the first goal of reducing the global rates of extreme poverty and hunger. However, the extent of achievement was uneven. In January 2016, the MDGs were replaced by the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in September 2015 by 193 UN Member States after an unprecedented global consultative process of more than three years. The new agenda is focused on building a sustainable world in which environmental sustainability, social inclusion and economic development are equally valued.

Poverty threatens the survival, daily life and dignity of every person, as well as being at the root of social injustices, political instability and violent extremism, and its eradication is crucial. Furthermore, the number of refugees, internally displaced persons and asylum seekers continues to grow due to factors such as the frequent emergence of new crises and conflicts.

The issue of refugees and displaced persons is a serious humanitarian problem that is causing friction in the international community over its resolution, and there are fears that this problem will worsen and persist over time. In addition, the impact of climate change has resulted in large-scale disasters in many parts of the world due to typhoons, torrential rains, droughts and large-scale fires. Natural disasters are expected to become more severe because of climate change; and there is concern that they will severely affect people in vulnerable environments. The number of people crossing borders has grown dramatically with globalisation. Global population growth, industrialisation and urbanisation will exacerbate water, food and health issues in the foreseeable future.

In view of the above, countries need to review and rethink their foreign policy priorities and their diplomacy. The use of artificial intelligence by countries is gaining prominence in shaping

a different international system which, as mentioned above, is complex, multifaceted and undergoing substantive changes.

Artificial intelligence has profound implications for international relations. Artificial intelligence and disruptive technologies in general are significantly transforming and redefining international relations and the international system, including international relations, diplomacy, trade and global security. It is a multifaceted impact.

Its influence not only transforms the dynamics of power, warfare and global governance, but also extends to reshaping diplomacy. The analysis of large amounts of data better informs negotiations and decision-making. The biggest risk we see is that international relations may be influenced and defined by those who best master this new disruptive technology that is artificial intelligence.

Finally, I would like to make a brief comment on Latin America and the Caribbean in the context of the emergence of disruptive technologies.

I appreciate that Latin America and the Caribbean, despite having little political and economic weight at the global level, seems to have benefited from the region's strategic position in the new multipolar order and the dynamics that have emerged. Thus, Latin America and the Caribbean have established diplomatic, commercial and political relations with different global actors. Although the region has made significant progress in recent years, it still faces challenges in terms of inequality, poverty and sustainable development. It is therefore essential that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean continue to work to strengthen their position in the new multipolar order and promote policies that foster inclusive and sustainable growth. In doing so, it is essential that Latin American and Caribbean countries develop government and education policies and join the nations that are using artificial intelligence as a necessary and effective tool for achieving national goals.

It is inevitable and extremely important for the development of policies appropriate to this new reality that diplomats and senior officials acquire and continuously train in the knowledge and practices that characterise these disruptive technologies.

We believe that knowing and understanding what is happening in the world is an essential responsibility of a diplomat or senior official; and by knowing and efficiently handling the tools of technology, they can contribute to the development of policies appropriate to the current and future world, as well as help implement foreign policy with third countries, at bilateral, regional, inter-regional and multilateral levels, bearing in mind both the opportunities and challenges presented by the international system.

Recommended reading

The Big Nine: How the Tech Titans and Their Thinking Machines Could Warp Humanity
Amy Webb
ISBN: 1541773756
ISBN13: 9781541773752
Release date: March 2019
Publisher: Public Affairs

Artificial Intelligence and International Law
Jazmin Lee
ISBN:9811914982
ISBN13:9789811914980
Release date: May 2023
Publisher: Springer

The Future of Power
Joseph S. Nye Jr.
ISBN: 1610390695
ISBN13: 9781610390699
Release Date: December 2011
Publisher: Public Affairs

Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence
Max Tegmark
ISBN 10: 0141981806
ISBN 13: 9780141981802
Publisher: Penguin Books Ltd, United Kingdom, Lon don, 2018

Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (Pear son+) 4th Edition
Authors
Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig
Publisher: Pearson
ISBN 9780134610993, 0134610997

Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power
Michael C. Horowitz
Texas National Security Review: Volume 1, Issue 3 (May 2018) Print: ISSN 2576-1021 Online: ISSN 2576-1153

La inteligencia artificial en el siglo 21
Heidy Isabel Hernández
Release date: 24 January 2023
https://news.registro.gt/2023/01/24/la-inteligencia-artificial-en-el-siglo-xxi/

La diplomacia en la era digital: Un diálogo sobre los procesos de transformación diplomática surgidos a raíz de los avances tecnológicos
Danna Valentina Álvarez Guzmán
Relaciones Internacionales AVAILABLE AT 48 • October 2021 – January 2022 Grupo de Estudios de Relaciones Internacionales Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Una diplomacia para el siglo 21 Visión y realidad desde la Escuela Diplomática de España
Alberto Antón Cortes
Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, No. 121, September-December 2021, pp. 117-126, ISSN 0185-6022

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DIPLOMACY: TECHPLOMACY

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1. Artificial intelligence and World Order: Disruptive technologies and the international system

The technological advances developed by artificial intelligence (AI) are causing great changes and transformations in societies in the legal, political, economic, social, cultural and even environmental spheres; one could think that it represents a new stage in our evolution as human beings[1] . In this new digital era, there has also been a change in the way we relate to each other as individuals, institutions and governments, and consequently, relations between States have also been modified.

The scientific discipline that deals with AI is computer science, therefore its foundations date back to the beginnings of the discipline itself in the 1940s and 1950s, and incorporated several different methods aimed at reproducing cognitive functions through computer science[2]. The term AI was first used in

1 Torres Jarrín, M. (2021). La UE & la gobernanza ética de la inteligencia artificial: Inteligencia Artificial & Diplomacia. Salamanca: Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía., Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca. https://revistas.upsa.es/index.php/cuadernossalmantinos/ article/ view/302

2 Benhamou, S. (2022). "La transformación del trabajo y el empleo en la era de la inteligencia artificial: análisis, ejemplos e interrogantes," Project Documents (LC/TS.2022/85), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

1956 at the Dartmouth conference, organised by the American mathematician John McCarthy, who introduced the concept together with Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, defining AI as "the science and engineering of making intelligent machines." In 1957, Frank Rosenblat designs the first "artificial neural network." In 1961, Marvin Minsky publishes his paper "*Steps Towards Artificial Intelligence*" and co-founds the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the Massachusetts Technology Institute.

During the 1980s, in 1982 to be precise, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry created a "fifth-generation computer" whose characteristic feature was to perform several calculations at the same time, using massive parallelism. Gradually, intelligent systems within computers began to be perfected and the first conversational programmes began to appear, such as the ALICE project (Artificial Linguistic Internet Computer Entity), whose creator was the American Richard Wallace.

In 1997, the company IBM created the supercomputer called "Deep Blue," designed to play chess, which managed to beat the world champion, the Russian Gari Kasparov. Since then, artificial intelligence has developed thanks to other technological advances such as the storage and processing of big data, logical reasoning, language processing, computing, the internet, among other emerging technologies. All these technological advances have changed the way we think, design, produce, market and even how we communicate.

In 2005, Raymond Kurzweil predicted that machines would reach the level of human intelligence by 2029, passing the "Turing test," and predicts that by 2045, the "singularity"[3] will be reached, which he defines as the connection of the human brain with AI to enhance human abilities, a fact that will

3 Kurzweil, R. (2021). "La singularidad está cerca. Cuando los humanos trascendamos la bio- logía." Lola Books.

represent a million-fold increase in intelligence. Furthermore, AI is estimated to have reached its full potential between 2030 and 2050, becoming a "Super Artificial Intelligence." Considering that, at the same time, devices that are connected to human brains are expected to be used by those years, such as, for example, "*Brain Computer Interfaces*," which are devices that enable direct interaction between the brain and a computer, so that humans can interact with the physical and virtual world using the mind. Companies such as Meta, Samsung, Snap and Valve are incorporating technologies and devices for capturing "neurodata." For Kurzweil, during the 2030s, a technology will be invented that can be introduced into our brains and enhance our minds; it will be a future of "man-machine synthesis"[4] unprecedented in the history of mankind.

Klaus Schwab goes beyond Kurzweil's predictions, saying that humanity is living in a new stage in which there will be a convergence of digital, physical and biological technologies[5], calling this new period the "Fourth Industrial Revolution"[6], which is led by companies belonging to the sector known as "Industry 4.0." The latter concept was introduced at the Hannover Messe industrial fair in 2011, and later, in 2013, it was taken up and developed as a concept within the German government's strategic document entitled "*Plattform Industrie 4.0*"[7], which was created under the innovation model called "Triple Helix" and which explains that Industry 4.0 is characterised by the integration of advanced digital technologies in manufacturing and production processes, which gives rise to processes such as automation. Advances in the field of AI

4 Kurzweil (2017). "La IA será inteligente en 2029 y nos fusionaremos con ella en 2045." IA Observatorio de Inteligencia Artificial.
https://observatorio-ia.com/kurzweil-ia-inteligente-2029-nos-fusionaremos-2045

5 Schawb, K. (2016). "The Fourth Industrial Revolution." Geneva: Worl Economic Forum.

6 Schawb, K. (2015). "The Fourth Industrial Revolution. What it means and how to respond." Foreign Affairs, December 2015, New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

7 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action and Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2024). Plattform Industrie 4.0.
https://www.plattform-i40.de/IP/Navigation/EN/Home/home.html

could even lead to a singularity, a tipping point where artificial intelligence surpasses human intelligence[8].

Humanity is witnessing a change of era, in which never have so many new technologies been produced in such a short period. Many emerging technologies have also been disruptive technologies, which has caused a transformation unprecedented in history. Disruptive technology is understood as that which manages to provoke a transformation in the processes and mechanisms prior to its appearance, as well as a change in the behaviour of users. In this context, when we talk about disruptive technologies, we think of technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data or robotics, virtual or augmented reality, etc. But we have forgotten that technologies such as the compass (2nd century), the printing press (1439), the steam engine (1712), the automobile (19th century), the telephone (1854), the computer (1940) or the Internet (1969-1989) were emerging technologies and even all of these were also disruptive technologies, because they meant transformations in the processes and mechanisms prior to their appearance, they meant changes in all areas of societies: legal, economic, social and cultural. This also represented a challenge for governments, which had to adapt to the times and create new laws and institutions to be able to regulate the use of each of these disruptive technologies.

2. Artificial intelligence and diplomacy: Big Tech Companies and World Tech Order

When we think of the international system, we probably immediately think of it as consisting of Nation States. However, this assertion is not entirely accurate. Originally the international system, as its name suggests, was a system between (translation of the Latin term *inter*) nations, but this is no longer the case today. There is a scholarly consensus on the origin of the

8 Nordhaus, W. (2015), "Are we approaching an economic singularity? Information technology and the future of economic growth," Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, No. 2021, New Haven, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics.

system between nations, which originates with the signing of the peace treaties of Osnabrück and Münster (1648), which ended the Thirty Years' War in the Holy Roman Empire and the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the United Provinces of the Netherlands. These treaties, also known as the Peace of Westphalia, are fundamental to the understanding of the history of international relations and the shaping of the world order as we know it. Since it is in these treaties that the concept of the "sovereignty of states" was also born.

The aim was to establish a balance of power to prevent the hegemony of a single nation or group of nations, and to lay the foundations for the development of *inter*-national law by defining relations between states based on sovereignty and legal equality. The Westphalian system operated from 1648 to 1951. During the 1950s, however, new actors emerged on the international scene: the regional unions, and with this historical event, the international system changed.

The Treaty of Paris (1951) and the Treaties of Rome (1957) set in motion the process of regional integration of European countries, in which European nation states begin to cede and share competences in favour of a supranational organisation, in which nation states are now member states of a common institution, and where sovereignty is shared by all its member states, which is what we know today as the European Union.

During the 1980s and 1990s, other new actors burst onto the international scene and began to develop external action at the global level: non-governmental organisations, foundations and associations of an international nature. These institutions began to participate, intervene and influence national decision-making and the creation of norms at the national, regional and global levels. By this time, we no longer speak of an international system, agenda or international affairs, but rather of global governance, global agenda and global affairs. The concepts of multi-level governance are born local, national, regional and global.

During the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, other actors emerged, the Big Tech Companies, which began to consolidate their power and influence during the decade between 2010 and 2020. The main Big Tech Companies in the world are mostly American and Chinese. Examples include Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Nvidia, Meta, Tesla, Tencent, Alibaba, Xiaomi and Baidu. To measure their economic power, it is enough to look at the capital of the first three (Microsoft, Apple and Nvidia), which amounts to 7,771 billion dollars[9], exceeding the combined Gross National Product of Germany and France, which together total 6,681 billion dollars[10]. This shows that their economic power and capacity can rival and even surpass that of many nation states.

Innovations driven by Big Tech Companies in areas such as artificial intelligence are transforming some sectors, including industry, agriculture, construction, as well as key services: education, health and banking. If, in addition, we consider the Big Tech Companies specialising in the communications sector, social media, data analytics, security and defence services, then we can also say that these companies have become key players challenging the power and influence of the governments of major nation states. Social networks can be used for awareness-raising campaigns, but they can also be used for disinformation campaigns, electoral processes and even demonstrations aimed at overthrowing authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, but they can also be used to organise campaigns to destabilise a democratic government. Governments are faced with the challenge of confronting these new economic actors, whose power, influence and financial resources are beyond the direct control of nation states. These companies are not only active in the economic and commercial life of countries, but

9 Statista: Leading tech companies worldwide 2024 by market capitalization. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1350976/leading-tech-companies-worldwide-by-market-cap/

10 Eurostat: Gross domestic product (GDP).
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Gross_domestic_product_(GDP)

also have a political, social and cultural impact. They are also intervening in matters of global governance, including foreign policy, defence, security and peacekeeping. In short, they are the new geopolitical actors and leaders of a new world order: the World Tech Order.

In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin said "whoever leads artificial intelligence will rule the world"[11]. In 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping indicated that his government was making "efforts to safeguard political security and improve the governance of internet data security and artificial intelligence"[12]. In the same year, US President Joe Biden mentioned that his "administration is committed to protecting the rights and safety of Americans while protecting privacy; to addressing bias and misinformation; to ensuring that artificial intelligence systems are secure before they are published"[13]. At the G20 summit, and under India's presidency, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reported that his government was working to regulate "cryptocurrencies, cyberspace security and human-centric artificial intelligence governance"[14]. The challenges presented by artificial intelligence in the foreign policy, security and defence affairs of governments are not only of concern to nation states but are also being addressed at the level of international organisations, regional integration bodies and defence alliances. Such is the case of NATO, which in 2021 adopted its own artificial intelligence strategy "NATO's first ever strategy

11 Europapress (2017). "Putin cree que el país que lidere la inteligencia artificial se convertirá en la primera potencia mundial."
https://www.europapress.es/portaltic/sector/noticia-putin-cree-pais-lidere-inteligencia-artificial-convertira-primera-potencia-mundial-20170905135003.html

12 Swissinfo.ch (2023). "Representantes de China discuten en un foro la construcción de una IA segura y confiable."
https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/representantes-de-china-discuten-en-un-foro-la-construcci%C3%B3n-de-una-ia-segura-y-confiable/48622078

13 Voz de América (2023). Biden dice que hay que abordar riesgos de la inteligencia artificial.
https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/biden-dice-abordar-riesgos-inteligencia-artificial/7146289.html

14 Voz de América (2023). Biden dice que hay que abordar riesgos de la inteligencia artificial.
https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/biden-dice-abordar-riesgos-inteligencia-artificial/7146289.html

for artificial intelligence"[15] together with a Data and Artificial Intelligence Review Board[16] dedicated to ensuring the lawful and responsible development of artificial intelligence through a certification standard.

In 2021 the European Commission proposed the first EU regulatory framework for artificial intelligence, called the "EU Artificial Intelligence Act"[17] which was adopted in 2024, and which defines 4 levels of risk:

EU Artificial Intelligence Act: Risk levels



Source: European Commission

15 Voz de América (2023). Biden dice que hay que abordar riesgos de la inteligencia artificial. https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/biden-dice-abordar-riesgos-inteligencia-artificial/7146289.html

16 NATO (2022). NATO´s Data and Artificial Intelligence Review Board. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_208374.htm

17 European Union (2024). Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amend- ing Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858,
(EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA relevance)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1689

For its part, the European Parliament is seeking with the EU AI Act to ensure that artificial intelligence systems used in the EU are safe, transparent, traceable, non-discriminatory and environmentally friendly[18].

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for a thematic session on artificial intelligence to be organised in the Security Council, a sign of how disruptive this technology is to international affairs such as security, defence and world peace: "Today I have urged the Security Council to address artificial intelligence with a sense of urgency, a global perspective and a learning mindset. We must work together to adopt common measures for transparency, accountability and oversight of AI systems"[19].

During the Security Council session, James Cleverly, UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Commonwealth and Development, intervened and noted that "AI could enhance or disrupt global strategic stability, challenge fundamental assumptions about defence and deterrence, and raise moral questions about accountability for lethal decisions in the field of war"[20].

There are currently six countries seeking to regulate artificial intelligence: Canada, the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom, India and China. There is also a debate on the need to put human beings at the centre of AI and to develop ethical governance of AI. On this last point, organisations such as the

18 European Parliament (2024). Artificial Intelligence Act. MEPs adopt landmark law. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240308IPR19015/artificial-intelli- gence-act-meps-adopt-landmark-law.

19 Naciones Unidas (2023). No abordar los riesgos de la inteligencia artificial es olvidar nuestras responsabilidades con las nuevas generaciones. https://news.un.org/es/story/2023/07/1522807

20 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2023). United Nations Security Council session on Artificial Intelligence: Foreign Secretary´s speech. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-speech-at-the-united-nations-security-council--2

OECD[21], the Council of Europe[22] and UNESCO[23] have drawn up recommendations for implementing international cooperation for reliable AI that respects human rights, democracy and the rule of law. However, it should also be noted that the digital era highlights the need to rethink human rights themselves, and to think of a new charter of human rights that includes digital rights.

3. Conclusions: Techplomacy and global tech governance

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that AI will affect 40% of jobs worldwide, and while it stresses that automation and information technology will improve productivity, it may also reduce wages and hiring levels[24]. At the same time, it indicates that emerging markets and low-income countries are expected to be 40% and 26% exposed to AI respectively. A major risk for these countries will be that in the absence of the infrastructure and skilled labour force needed to exploit the benefits of AI, the risk is that the technology will deepen inequality between countries.

A study of 125 countries by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) found that Singapore, the United States and Denmark scored highest when it came to correlating AI readiness rates and employment rates in high-exposure occupations. Whereas, in emerging economies and developing countries,

21 OECD (2024). OECD Legal Instruments. Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence. https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0449

22 Council of Europe (2024). Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. https://rm.coe.int/1680afae3c

23 UNESCO (2023). Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000381137

24 Fondo Monetario Internacional (2024). La economía mundial transformada por la inteligencia artificial ha de beneficiar a la humanidad. https://www.imf.org/es/Blogs/Articles/2024/01/14/ai-will-transform-the-global-economy-lets-make-sure-it-benefits-humanity#:~:text=inteligencia%20artificial-,La%20econom%C3%ADa%20mundial%20transformada%20por%20la%20inteligencia%20artificial%20ha%20de,deben%20encontrar%20un%20fino%20equilibrio.

the priority should be to lay a firm foundation by investing in digital infrastructure and a digitally competent workforce[25].

For McKinsey, AI has the potential to generate an additional global economic activity of around 13 trillion dollars by 2030[26]. PwC puts this figure at 15.7 trillion dollars to the world economy[27].

According to the OECD there are three sectors that will be mainly exposed to AI[28]:

1. The transport sector: For example, the autonomous vehicle developed and driven by companies such as Uber, General Motor, Tesla or Navya.

2. The banking sector: AI has transformed this sector from changes in customer service to risk management, predictive analytics, fraud detection, process automation or automated financial advice.

3. The healthcare sector: Advanced medical diagnostics, personalised medicine, development of new drugs, virtual assistants and medical chatbots, optimisation of hospital management, remote and telematic monitoring, robotic surgery.

According to ECLAC data, the region's AI firms account for less than 3% of the global total, compared to 37% or 30% for US and European firms, respectively. At the same time, the combined investment in AI of all countries in the

25 Organización Internacional del Trabajo (2024). Artificial Intelligence. https://www.ilo.org/artificial-intelligence

26 McKinsey & Company (2019). Enfrentando los riesgos de la inteligencia artificial. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/quantumblack/our-insights/confronting-the-ris- ks-of-artificial-intelligence/es-CL

27 PwC (2017). Sizing the Price. What´s the real value of AI for your business and how can you capitalize?
https://www.pwc.es/es/publicaciones/tecnologia/assets/ai-analysis-sizing-the-prize.pdf

28 OECD (2023). AI and work. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/ai-and-work.html

region did not exceed 1.7% of the amount invested by the US or 5% by China[29].

In Europe, experts estimate that AI could increase the EU's GDP by 16.3 trillion euros by 2030. This requires a reindustrialisation of the productive fabric. In January 2024 the European Commission launched a package of measures encouraging AI innovation to support AI start-ups and SMEs. According to the European Central Bank, AI is creating jobs, especially for younger and highly skilled people, although it also points out that there may be neutral to negative effects on workers' incomes[30].

In 2017, the Danish government presented three new concepts that have made us rethink international relations: Techplomacy, Tech Ambassadors & Tech Embassies. The first refers to the need to develop a foreign policy focused on developing relations between states and companies in the "Tech" sector, especially the Big Tech Companies. Next, to open tech embassies in the places where these Big Tech Companies are located and finally, to appoint a Tech Ambassador to represent the country before these new geopolitical actors.

These three concepts were included in the foreign and security policy strategy for 2027-2018, with Danish Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod arguing for the need to develop these new lines of work within foreign policy:

"During the last decades, globalisation has brought prosperity and better living conditions for people all over the world. Also for Denmark. But globally, not everyone has benefited equally from the development. At the same time, technological development, digitalisation and the exponential growth

29 CEPAL (2024). CEPAL lanzó Observatorio de Desarrollo Digital para contribuir a la transformación digital de América Latina y el Caribe. https://www.cepal.org/es/comunicados/cepal-lanzo-observatorio-desarrollo-digital-contri- buir-la-transformacion-digital-america

30 Banco Central Europeo (2023). New Technologies and jobs in Europe. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2831~fabeeb6849.en.pdf

of data and computing power (called the fourth industrial revolution) have a profound effect on our economy, labour market and society.

There is great potential in strengthening the efforts to move Danish trade positions and attract the necessary knowledge, technology and investment. That is why the government wants to strengthen economic diplomacy through a targeted effort towards emerging economies, e.g. Asia and Latin America.

The government is making digitalisation and technological development a strategic priority in Danish foreign policy [...] Denmark must position itself as an attractive global knowledge hub"[31].

What seemed to be a nonsense of initiatives and theories on the future of international relations, the evidence shows that the Danes were right, that the time has come to rethink the way of conceiving international relations, to redefine the priorities and lines of work in foreign policy, security and defence of countries, and finally to rethink the current reconfiguration of the world order we are witnessing.

Since the launch of the Danish initiative in 2017 to date, 5 countries have developed their own techplomacy, i.e. implemented their own foreign policy towards the technology sector: Australia, France, Germany, Switzerland, Estonia. And even the European Union and the United Nations have nominated and appointed a Special Envoy for the tech sector:

Australia: In 2017, Australia appointed Dr Tobias Feakin as Ambassador for Cyberspace Affairs and Critical Technology. He began as ambassador for cyberspace affairs, but his mandate was expanded to include looking at the role of technology in geopolitics. In 2021, the Australian government presented

31 The Office of the Danish Tech ambassador (2024). https://techamb.um.dk/the-techplomacy-approach

its "Australia´s International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy," which states as a priority that Australia will seek to improve its diplomacy on issues concerning cyber and critical technologies.

Australia has also put forward its own concept of Techplomacy, which it calls "Cyber and Critical Technology Diplomacy," which aims to make Australia an influential leader in cyberspace issues. On 23 December 2020, its Chancellor Payne announced the creation of the "Quad Tech Network (QTN)," which is made up of academic and research institutions from each of the four "Quad" (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) member states: Australia, the United States, India and Japan. This initiative can be seen as a declaration of intent to consolidate the Indo-Pacific region's economic and geopolitical leadership as the hub of a new international system, with the Asia-Pacific region at its centre. President Joe Biden has appointed a coordinator for the Indo-Pacific region (Big tech companies). Both the USA and Russia see AI as a determining factor in the future. Summit of Democracies (create a coalition for emerging technologies, including 5G and AI). The EU suggests a "global tech collaboration" between the EU and the US.

France: In December 2017, it presented its "Stratégie internationale de la France pour le numérique" and later in 2019 appointed Ambassador David Martinon as "Ambassador for digital Affairs" in Silicon Valley (Ministère de L´Europe et des Affaires Étrangéres, 2019)

The French strategy focuses on five themes:

1. Promoting and monitoring the development of innovations and the control of cutting-edge technologies, in particular those related to artificial intelligence.

2. Ensuring the international security and stability of the

digital space.

3. Promoting human rights, democratic values and the French language in the digital world.
4. Strengthening the influence and attractiveness of French digital actors.
5. Contributing to the governance of the Internet (Ministère de *L´Europe et des Affaires Étrangéres, 2017*).

Germany: In August 2018, Ambassador Hinrich Thoelken was appointed "*Special Representative for International Digitalisation Policy and Digital Transformation*" at the German Federal Foreign Office to analyse the effects of digital transformation on the economy, society and internationally in order to develop a foreign policy strategy for the digital age.

"The German Federal Foreign Office is directly affected by the rapid pace of technological change [...]. This applies to its mission as a foreign policy agency and service provider, as a ministry and government employer. Technologies such as Big Data, Machine Learning and quantum computing may lead to new global balances of economic and political power. [...] Non-state actors are increasingly able to set the agenda. Technological progress also raises the question of how we will continue to fulfil our sovereign tasks in the future."

Switzerland: In November 2020, the Swiss government presented its "*Digital Foreign Policy Strategy 2021-24*," which aims to initiate a new phase in shaping the governance of digital issues. The Swiss federal government appointed Dr. Jon Fanzun as "*Special Envoy for Cyber Foreign and Security Policy*." The strategy responded to a proposal that the Federal Council called "postulate 17.3789," which was proposed on 28 September 2017, and whose aim was to elucidate "How Switzerland could become the global epicentre of international cyberspace governance." The postulate also en-

visaged the creation of a "Geneva Convention for Digitalisation" and the foundation of a neutral organisation in Geneva to ensure compliance with the convention (Federal Council of Switzerland, 2020).

Switzerland has been at the forefront of efforts to establish norms in cyberspace and Internet governance. In 2003, Geneva hosted the Internet Governance Forum; in 2013 it was a pioneer in proposing confidence-building measures in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe; it held the chairmanship of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Cybersecurity. Along with Singapore, Estonia, Rwanda and the Netherlands, Switzerland has been one of the leading countries in promoting more inclusive digital governance at the global level (Kurbalija, 2021).

Estonia: The Estonian government appointed Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar as "*Ambassador at Large for Cyber Diplomacy*" in 2018, and in 2019 she was appointed as Director of the Department for Cyber Diplomacy. For Ambassador Tiirmaa-Klaar:

"It is important to continue the efforts that have already been initiated in Estonia to analyse the applicability of existing international law in cyberspace, as well as to support international processes that promote cyber norms and confidence-building measures. Estonia will also continue to actively participate in ongoing EU and NATO cyber initiatives and strengthen bilateral cooperation in the field of cyber security with its allies."

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Estonia, 2018).

For Estonia, Cyber Diplomacy refers to the behaviour of the government in cyberspace and to ensuring compliance with existing international norms.

Technology centres, also known as "tech hubs" or "tech-industry cities," are set to become the new political capitals of the world, as this is where future decisions on trade in goods

and services in the new digital era are decided and taken. Although Silicon Valley is to date the largest tech hub in terms of the concentration of companies developing a large part of the emerging and disruptive technologies, there are other hubs such as Shenzhen (China), Skolkovo Technopark District (Russia), Dubai Silicon Oasis (United Arab Emirates), Bangalore (India), Silicon Wadi (Israel) or Silicon Roundabout (United Kingdom). Places where the number of tech embassies can be expanded.

Big Tech Companies are de facto the new geopolitical actors and define a large part of the global agenda; therefore, global governance is also facing a restructuring. Based on the premise that we are living in a digital era, that this is being developed by the current Fourth Industrial Revolution, and that this is led by companies in the technology sector, Industry 4.0, then countries must develop Techplomacy as a foreign policy instrument to face the challenges of a new Global Tech Governance[32].

Techplomacy can help governments gain the information they need to be able to know, firstly, about technological advances, secondly, to be able to study their impact on their societies and, finally, to be able to create norms[33]. It is necessary to create norms and define international standards, for which it is essential to convene an international conference to debate, agree and draw up a global treaty to regulate cyberspace[34] and the external action of Big Tech Companies[35], and take into account that

32 Torres Jarrín, M. (2023). Rethinking EU-CELAC Interregionalism in the Digital World: Techplomacy as a Foreign Policy Instrument for the Global Tech Governance, in Gardini, G.L. The redefinition of the EU presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. P

33 Torres Jarrín, M. & Riordan, S. (2021). A G20 Tech Diplomacy. Policy Brief G20 Italy 2021. https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/TF8-A-G20-TECH-DIPLOMACY.pdf

34 Torres Jarrín, M. & Riordan, S. (2020). The cyber diplomacy of constructing norms in cyberspace. Policy Brief G20 Saudi Arabia 2020.
https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/T20_TF5_PB4.pdf

35 Torres Jarrín, M. & Riordan, S. (2019). Techplomacy. Hacia la búsqueda de una regulación del ciberespacio y la gobernanza de internet, en Beltrame de Moura, A. O Direito Internacional Privado Europeu entre a harmonizacao e a fragmentaca, Brazil: EMais. pp. 95-112.

the development of AI implies greater demand for energy and rare earth metals and other resources, so governments must ensure an equitable distribution of costs and benefits between the global North and the global South, underlining globally acceptable environmental and ethical standards[36].

36 Garofali, A., Riordan, S., and Torres Jarrín, M. (2023). The Environmental and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence. Policy Brief G20 India 2023. https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/policy_brief/the-environmental-and-ethical-challenges-of-artificial-intelligence/
See also: Riordan, S., Torres Jarrín, M., and Garofali, A. (2023). A framework for the global governance of private cybersecurity companies. Policy Brief G20 India 2023. https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/T20_PB_TF7_6_A_ Framework_for_the_Global_Governance_of_Private_Cybersecurity_Companies.pdf

GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO REGULATE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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Introduction

In this article, artificial intelligence (AI) refers to the ability of a machine to exhibit the same capabilities as humans, such as reasoning, learning, creativity and the ability to plan. AI enables technological systems to perceive their environment, interact with it, solve problems and act for a specific purpose.

AI systems already have the ability to make difficult decisions that until now have been based on the human mind or on laws and court rules. Such decisions range from life-and-death issues, such as the use of lethally armed autonomous drones in the military, to political and economic issues affecting the population, such as ideological manipulation or job losses due to AI-driven automation that may affect low-skilled workers by increasing the wage gap.

The main advantages of AI are greater efficiency in complex tasks, automation of processes, greater capacity to analyse

large volumes of data, minimising human error, improving security and defence, advancing medicine and energy efficiency, innovating in industry or achieving maximum performance in decision-making.

In a study by Stanford University – dated July 2023 – on the most pressing dangers of AI, the researchers state: *"AI systems are being used in the service of disinformation on the Internet, giving them the potential to become a threat to democracy and a tool for fascism. From* ***deepfake videos*** *to* ***online bots*** *that manipulate public discourse by faking consensus and spreading fake news, there is a danger of AI systems undermining social trust. Technology can fall into the hands of criminals, rogue states, ideological extremists or simply special interest groups, in order to manipulate people for economic gain or political advantage"*[37].

Underpinning this reference environment, where some possible risks to be considered in its application are already apparent, AI regulation is necessary and crucial for several reasons, including: a) ensuring that human rights are respected; b) that its development is transparent and accountable, where appropriate; c) that it is safe and reliable, minimising risks; and d) that it meets ethical standards.

Regulations in place

Considering the four premises cited above and seven of the most representative actors in the current geopolitical landscape, in general, two types of regulations can be considered: restrictive and open. In the first classification we find the European Union. Indeed, on 21 May 2024, the EU Council passed the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act), a world-first law aimed at harmonising AI standards, which aims to encourage the development and adoption of safe and reliable AI systems in the EU market. To monitor compliance and implementation of the

37 ttps://forbes.es/tecnologia/316482/estos-son-los-15-mayores-riesgos-de-la-ia/

Act in the Member States, the European AI Office was set up within the Commission in February this year.

The approach of this Act is risk-based. It establishes four types of risk: unacceptable risk, high risk, limited risk and minimal risk. It starts from the premise, assigned to unacceptable risk, that all AI systems that are considered a clear threat to security, livelihoods and the rights of individuals will be prohibited. AI systems identified as high risk are subject to strict obligations before they can be placed on the market. Those of limited risk relate to risks associated with the lack of transparency in the use of AI, while for minimal risk the law allows for the free use of AI.

In Brazil, Bill 2.338/23 will impose governance measures for transparency and security in AI systems, prevent discriminatory practices, classify the risks of AI models similar to European law and impose robust security measures according to the degree of risk of the systems developed and applied in the country.

Moreover, given the importance of trade and technological cooperation between Brazil and European countries, Brazilian companies wishing to operate with the EU or already operating in this market are likely to need to adapt their operations to the new European standards which, in turn, may accelerate the harmonisation of AI policies between the two regions.

Canada's Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA) of April 2024 is a critical step in navigating the world of AI. Marking a demonstrative milestone towards a regulatory framework, AIDA ensures the safe and responsible development and deployment of AI technologies. It promotes innovation while guiding Canada's approach to global standards, setting a precedent for AI governance[38].

Canada has demonstrated a strong commitment to AI devel-

38 Canada's Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA) 2024: A Comprehensive Guide - Cox & Palmer (coxandpalmerlaw.com)

opment and regulation. AIDA emphasises safety, transparency and accountability. Entities must ensure continuous monitoring and publicly disclose information on the operation, intended use and risk management of high-impact AI systems. It establishes the role of the AI and Data Commissioner to oversee compliance and act as a liaison between government and the private sector.

India has recently made a U-turn in its stance towards AI regulation. Whereas in the 2018 National Plan on AI, the Indus country was not in favour of regulation, now "significant" technology companies must obtain government permission before launching new AI models. It marks a radical departure from its previous "hands-free" policy.

The Indian government considers AI an important strategic area of the technology sector. It also believes that AI will have a dynamic effect on the growth of entrepreneurship and business, and the government is taking all necessary steps in policy and infrastructure to develop a strong AI sector in the country.

Moving on to more open regulations, in the United States, AI is currently in the political debate. At the end of last October, President Joe Biden issued an Executive Order (EO) that took the form of a broad directive calling for more transparency and new rules. In particular, a US AI policy has begun to be developed that emphasises best practices and reliance on different agencies to develop their own standards.

The planned US regulation is more open than previous ones. There are already several legislative proposals in progress that affect various aspects of AI, such as transparency, deepfakes and platform liability. Given what has been seen with the impact of generative AI on social media platforms and disinformation, the 2024 presidential election will undoubtedly influ-

ence much of the debate on AI regulation[39]. Moreover, the new US AI Security Institute is tasked with implementing most of the policies envisaged in the EO.

In June 2023, China's highest governing body, the State Council, announced in its legislative agenda an Artificial Intelligence Law. This law would be all-encompassing, much like the EU's AI law. There is no clear information on this ambitious goal, particularly on how long the legislative process would take. It is possible that Chinese regulators will introduce new rules to cope with modern AI system tools. However, the reality in China is harsher. Chinese companies in the field of generative AI rely almost entirely on underlying US systems.

Until now, AI regulation in China has been very fragmented and piecemeal. The country has one set of rules for algorithmic recommendation services, another for deepfakes and a third for generative AI. However, researchers from the Academy of Social Sciences proposed in August 2023 the creation of a National AI Office to oversee the development of AI in China.

The United Kingdom, in its Data Protection and AI Bill of March 2023, aims to defend specific brands without risk allocation, help and support innovation, reduce administrative burden, introduce a category of data of legitimate interest, support international trade, as well as consider its organisation an attractive destination in both the learning process and automated operation.

It is a relevant document, especially given that the UK is the world's third largest AI research and development country and is home to a third of all European AI companies, almost twice as many as any other European country. In short, the spirit of UK policy on AI technology is to strike a balance between innovation and responsibility.

39 Vuelta al mundo por las regulaciones de la IA en 2024 | MIT Technology Review en español

Approaching the regulation of AI in warfare

The development and use of new technologies in warfare is inherent to the military profession. Throughout military history, technological innovation has been a fundamental part of the evolution of warfare in which soldiers have had to learn to handle modern technological inventions. In this sense, the integration of AI into the art of warfare is nothing new to the military profession. How much power is gained from this new disruptive technology will be another matter.

In the spring of 2022, the US Department of Defence created the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office to explore how AI can help the military. In November 2023, the Department of Defence published its strategy for adopting AI technologies. It optimistically reports that the latest advances in data, analytics and AI technologies enable leaders to make better decisions faster, from the top level of a Command Post to the lowest level of the battlefield, the Platoon command[40].

However, research by the US Navy led to the publication of guidelines limiting the use of LLMs (Large Language Models) - AI systems trained on large collections of data that generate text, word for word, based on what has been written before - citing security vulnerabilities and the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. It was later confirmed that such investigations were justified.

That is, LLMs can be useful, but their actions are also difficult to predict and can make dangerous calls and escalations. Therefore, the military must regulate and place limits on these technologies when they are used to make high-risk decisions, especially in combat situations. LLMs have many uses in the military world, but it is dangerous to delegate high-risk decisions to machines.

40 Why the Military Can't Trust AI - Revista de Prensa (almendron.com)

LLMs can perform military tasks that require the processing of large amounts of data in very short timeframes, which means that militaries may want to use them to ensure maximum efficiency in decision-making or to streamline bureaucratic functions. On the other hand, LLMs are considered well suited for military planning, command and intelligence. Moreover, they could automate much of scenario planning, war gaming, budgeting and training.

It is true that militaries want to use LLMs and other AI-based decision-making tools, but it is also true that there are real limitations and dangers. Armies relying on these technologies to make decisions therefore need not only to understand more deeply how LLMs work and the importance of their differences in design and execution, but also to regulate in detail their application and execution, particularly in making high-risk and highly complex decisions about escalation and warfare. It is imperative that militaries are aware that the performance of LLM can never be fully guaranteed.

In a research project in the United States, the behaviour of LLMs from several leading companies was studied in a war game focused on whether to escalate. Each LLM, representing a country, was asked what their choice was, with the researchers varying the objectives of each country. Although they had all been trained differently, they all opted for escalation, showing a preference for arms races, conflict and even the use of nuclear weapons[41].

Looking to the future

It is very important to have common definitions such as those that currently exist between the United States and the European Union. Having the same definitions at the universal level is extremely valuable. At the moment there is already collaboration between many international institutions to put them into practice.

41 Why the Military Can't Trust AI - Revista de Prensa (almendron.com)

Regulations should arrive at the same results, i.e. have a common set of practices that are based on a risk management system that uses artificial intelligence through quality data to ensure that the technology they are deploying is not corrupted or biased and set the way in which the transparency of the methods they are using is shown. On the other hand, it is imperative to have as much interoperability as possible.

The regulation of AI in armies, especially in combat, is an unavoidable necessity. To that end, strict rules must be established in military institutions, making it clear that decisions involving the use of violence must never be delegated to machines.

In the geo-political world, AI is a key power element, alongside the economy, the military sector and the quality of government relations. Encouraging ethical governance, with a balanced regulatory approach and a holistic view of the impact of AI is crucial. And there is no doubt that AI regulation is unquestionable.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ERA OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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In the development of international relations, there has been a close linkage with technological processes and artificial intelligence (AI)-related advances in the global development agenda, which have changed the perspective with which we perceive our environment in contrast to everyday life. AI is embedded in our digital lives, as simply as in the recommendation of personalised content based on our interests and preferences.

The progress of AI unfolds in a context of major global disruptions that are changing the way societies operate and holds the prospect of a major transformation within the dynamics of international relations with evident economic, political and social effects and influence. In an increasingly globalised society, partnerships have basically become an essential tool to address development policies and programmes that transcend borders. In this context, we can perceive that AI has had a decisive and guiding impact in public diplomacy, alluding to the communication efforts and strategies that a country uses to interact with foreign audiences, as well as to build positive relationships,

promote its image and values on the global stage (Morales Lama, 2022).

At the same time, the evolution of machines that mimic human intelligence to systematise and process routine activities is being handled with increasing perfection, reflected through the optimisation of various operations in different sectors, including diplomatic work. The processes of evolution of ground and airborne machines, up to and including the development of weapons, including nuclear weapons and the advent of the Internet, have been decisive elements in understanding the evolution of the global political configuration, including international power dynamics processes, and development cooperation in the field of AI is becoming more and more common.

As algorithms assimilate the available data, their adaptation and evolution is radically transformed, allowing them to improve their accuracy without direct human intervention. For this reason, in recent years, the use of AI has shown significant progress, and various international organisations, institutions and governments have begun to regulate its use in order to maximise its benefits, reduce risks and, above all, improve efficiency in different sections through its correct implementation. AI-driven algorithms have helped adapt content, taking into consideration generational, cultural and linguistic contrasts, and converging towards a more inclusive society.

Moreover, AI-driven content recommendations and social media algorithms have helped diplomatic staff reach a wider audience that is aligned and engaged with foreign policy interests with governments that have used the tool. Rebuilding global governance by updating the policies and measures addressed by various international organisations, institutions and governments has demonstrated the potential of AI to advance global welfare.

Although some actors in international society see AI - like any technological tool - as a great opportunity to achieve goals and objectives in a myriad of areas, there are those who defend the potential of AI to greatly improve our ability to manage information flows in international relations (ACPD, 2023). While machines cannot make decisions because they are configured to follow a pattern, they do not possess or understand ethical principles, and in addition to the great debate about the scope of decision-making, digital pacts have now been put in place to establish clear strategies for governments, companies and institutions and to consider the link in terms of responsibility for the repercussions that may arise and thus identify limits.

Undeniably, governments and global society must be prepared to take on the challenges and opportunities presented by the development of technologies immersed in information technology, robotics, biotechnology, nanotechnology and AI, among others. In this regard, the governments of the different countries will have to assume and face situations such as the increase in existing inequalities between and within them; countries that do not have access to these technologies or that are unable to develop them are highly likely to have a slower process of growth and progress.

Likewise, we must bear in mind the new dangers for security, considering that disruptive technologies can be used to develop new weapons and surveillance tools, which could lead to a new arms race that would translate into instability in global progress in different areas, a scenario that could generate governance problems. The global nature of disruptive technologies makes it difficult to regulate and control their use, which could lead to problems such as cybercrime, piracy and the spread of misinformation, as well as the loss of jobs in some sectors and the possibility of political, social and economic unrest.

However, the scenario is not as chaotic as some authors suggest; it is not all negative and there is much to be gained by making good use of these technologies. Through them, we can promote economic development; improve the provision of public services such as education, health and their care, as well as be great allies in the fight against climate change with the development of innovative solutions to tackle it. They can also be used to foster international cooperation in areas such as scientific research, global health and comprehensive disaster risk management, including for communication among societies.

Good use of AI tools can help formulate responses to crises, quickly and efficiently analyse information, identify potential threats and provide information on appropriate courses of action, especially valuable in times of crisis or international emergencies. Similarly, in an era where cyber threats can affect international relations, AI can be used to monitor and protect the sanctity of communications and other sources of information that need to be protected from cyber-attacks. In short, AI has the potential to positively revolutionise diplomacy by offering new tools and approaches to address global challenges, provided it is approached responsibly, carefully and thoughtfully.

In the last decades, different governments have advanced with the commitment to the responsible and effective use of digital technologies, including the use of different knowledge in the field of AI, industrial internet, among others, for economic and social development with adherence to principles of social inclusion, transparency, and sustainability. Similarly, it should be considered that innovation and communication in the different spheres of power have historically played an important role, while information technologies have played a key role in contributing to the development of the global agenda.

In this regard, we must bear in mind that the development of different technologies, including AI, represents an opportunity to provide effective solutions to the main problems of humanity, such as energy security, climate change, water and food scarcity, even diseases, as we have witnessed with the measures implemented post-COVID-19, making clear the need to move towards a collaborative global governance for the benefit of society.

Positively, AI-related processes have a lot to contribute to the analysis of the implications and potentials of these technologies, together with the public sector, the private sector and civil society. The more developed countries, based on their higher level of infrastructure, convergence and digital literacy, will be able to take the lead in optimal implementation processes and support their successful application in developing countries by establishing guidelines for appropriate, clear and effective regulatory frameworks to govern the development and use of technologies in an inclusive manner, taking into consideration the interests of all stakeholders.

In the Latin American and Caribbean region, the use of AI is progressing. Recently, on 9 August 2024, at the Latin American and Caribbean Ministerial Summit for Artificial Intelligence 'ColombIA,' held in the city of Cartagena, sixteen countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Curaçao, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname and Uruguay) adopted the "Declaration of Cartagena de Indias for the Governance, the Building of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Ecosystems and the Promotion of Ethical and Responsible AI Education in Latin America and the Caribbean," a document which establishes a joint commitment around three key areas: i) development of enabling ecosystems; ii) digital education; and

iii) governance.[42]

Today more than ever, it is imperative to drive the development of our region with clear guidelines such as economic justice, health justice and reduction of gender inequalities, as well as the digital divide. Efforts must continue to be made to improve cybersecurity, industrial and personal data protection in order to safeguard lives and induce livelihoods through the reduction of social inequality and stability of economies. Only through unity, solidarity, cooperation and good use of technology will we transform our societies, the way we relate to each other and above all the way we perceive international relations.

With a population of over 650 million, Latin America is an ideal place to develop systems that can be deployed at scale. The highly strategic role of AI in economic development puts our region at an advantage. As such, it will not only be key to defining the future of this technology but can also assume a leading role in the global governance of artificial intelligence (García Periche, 2021).

In this context, regional governments should continue to strengthen exchanges between scientific and technological authorities in order to increase synergies between the innovation and scientific sectors to optimally develop exchange and specialised activities among researchers, academics and society, which will exploit cooperation in the transfer of state-of-the-art methods and promote multilateral cooperation.

42 In the development of enabling ecosystems, the countries recognise the need to work together to build ecosystems that promote the development of AI in an ethical, safe, inclusive and efficient manner, seeking to turn AI into an engine for local innovation, sustainable development and economic growth in the region, thus reducing economic, social and digital divides. Regarding digital education, the intention of the countries to promote education and training in digital issues, as well as the exchange of good practices in the use of AI in the education system, in order to prepare people with digital skills to face the challenges of AI in the workplace, is underlined.In the area of governance, they reaffirmed their commitment to promote the development and use of AI in a safe, inclusive, and ethical manner, respecting human rights and fostering innovation and sustainability.

As mentioned above, AI has sufficiently favourable aspects when handled appropriately, evidencing increased opportunities, analytics, efficiency and productivity, which translates into greater political, economic and social development, depending on the sphere of application. With specific reference to inter-national relations, these changes and advantages manifest themselves in a positive influence on the dynamics of soft power and hard power in a more tangible and credible way in the eyes of society, acquiring greater prominence on an international scale.

The implications of the advancement of AI on the international political landscape are evident, as it addresses issues such as global power-shaping, the international development agenda and technological sovereignty. While this reflection seeks to foster a greater understanding of these issues, it is important to note that it does not seek to limit the discussion to these topics alone. Rather, it recognises that the intersection between this technology and international relations is complex and encompasses a range of issues.

There is a need for governments to use it responsibly to take advantage of the opportunities and benefits it offers and thus better understand geopolitical dynamics in order to identify opportunities for collaboration and address conflicts more effectively, in consideration of the great opportunities to contribute concretely to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) associated with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

AI is undoubtedly revolutionising the field of diplomacy by offering advanced tools and capabilities to analyse data, predict trends, facilitate decision-making and improve efficiency in international negotiations. It is therefore essential to continue exploring and debating this intersection and joint work

between governments and civil society in order to gain a better understanding of its implications at the international level, so as to continue fostering the exchange of knowledge, information, best practices and other resources, while respecting national legislations, in order to develop favourable scenarios for AI in our region.

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DIGITAL COOPERATION OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF BI-REGIONAL AGENDA

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Introduction

The Latin American and Caribbean and European regions have a long-shared history. Over time they have forged strong cultural, social, economic and political ties, which evolve and adapt to the prevailing conditions of their relationship. On the threshold of the 21st century, the digital era has introduced a new paradigm that marks a turning point for this bi-regional partnership.

The so-called Industry 4.0 or Fourth Industrial Revolution poses a reconfiguration of the forms of interaction, work and development not only of societies, but also of international relations and their foreign policy management dynamics. This reality requires continuous adaptation of traditional diplomatic practices and careful navigation of this ocean that opens up new opportunities for international cooperation and mutual understanding.

This chapter explores the potential of digital cooperation between Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union as a fundamental pillar to strengthen their relationship not only in the political and economic sphere, but also as a catalyst for sustainable

development and innovation. It addresses the current state of digitalisation in both regions, highlighting contrasts and shared challenges. It analyses the Global Gateway strategy and the EU-LAC Digital Alliance as key mechanisms for bridging the digital divide and fostering innovation.

The text also emphasises the importance of coordination between LAC regional bodies and mechanisms and proposes specific areas of collaboration based on the Declaration of the EU-CELAC Summit 2023. Finally, it discusses the relevance of the upcoming UN Future Summit in advancing global digital governance and underlines the increasing centrality of technology in international relations and conflict resolution.

The state of digitalisation in Latin America and the Caribbean and in the European Union

The current state of digitalisation in the regions of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and the European Union (EU) is one of shared concerns and challenges, which highlights the need to implement effective and mutually beneficial cooperation schemes.

In LAC, digitalisation has been experiencing rapid growth in sectors such as mobile connectivity, e-government development, the so-called "entrepreneurship ecosystems," universities with artificial intelligence faculties, among others. For its part, digitalisation in the EU has a robust telecommunications infrastructure, a high level of connectivity and widespread use of digital technologies, both in the private and public sectors. This allows a large percentage of the population to have access to high-speed Internet and spaces to develop and use basic digital skills.

Both regions face challenges in digital inclusion, infrastructure expansion and adaptation of regulatory frameworks. However, the challenges in the digitalisation process of LAC are more

pronounced in terms of connectivity, the digital skills of the population, the high cost of digital access, insufficient investment and significant urban-rural divide.

In contrast, the complementarities between the regions are many and very positive. For LAC, it is an opportunity to learn about European best practices and experiences on digital policies, regulation, development of skills, public and private innovation, and access to European markets, among others. For Europe, it is an opportunity to invest in a growing market for digital solutions with great potential for innovation adapted to developing contexts.

Against this backdrop, the Global Gateway strategy and the Digital Alliance are inserted as cooperation mechanisms that can help reduce the digital divide and the negative impact it has on the social and economic development of LAC, especially in those sectors of the population that face conditions of greater vulnerability, such as indigenous people, people of African descent or people with disabilities, among others. Digital progress also poses particular challenges for women and girls, which is why it is imperative to incorporate a gender perspective as a cross-cutting issue in these mechanisms.

Global Gateway and the EU-LAC Digital Alliance

Global Gateway is a strategy launched in 2021 with which the European Union seeks to "promote smart, clean and secure links in the digital, energy and transport sectors, and to strengthen health, education and research systems worldwide"[43]. It has a budget of 300 billion euros which, from 2021 to 2027, will be invested in sustainable projects to help reduce the global investment gap. The strategy is aligned with the 2030 Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement. It also aims to enable EU partners to create

43 Comisión Europea. (s.f.). *Global Gateway: Visión general*. International Partnerships - European Commission. https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/global-gateway-overview_es

better conditions for their economic and social development.

Within this framework is the European Union's Digital Alliance with Latin America and the Caribbean, an informal cooperation initiative launched in March 2023 that promotes digital transformation with a people-centred approach and technological development with inclusiveness and sustainability. The Alliance's dialogue and collaboration spans diverse technology areas such as digital policy, Internet governance, infrastructure, cyber security and artificial intelligence.

Bi-regional cooperation with regional coordination

The EU-LAC Digital Alliance aims to create a transatlantic digital space based on shared values such as data protection, ethics in artificial intelligence and the promotion of digital democracy.[44] Under this premise, for LAC, the Alliance is configured as an opportunity to accelerate digital transformation, foster local innovation and reduce the technological gap; for the EU, it is a tool to open new markets for its technology companies, expand its digital influence, promote its regulatory standards; and for both regions, it is a great strategy to improve their positioning and competitiveness as global players in the digital economy, as well as their capacity to collaborate with technological powers.

To achieve these ambitious objectives, it is essential that there is excellent coordination between the EU and Latin American and Caribbean countries and regional mechanisms and organisations (RMOs), and that they work more effectively with each other, providing opportunities and spaces for each to contribute from their areas of specialisation and strengths.

This could start with the establishment of a platform that serves as a focal point to coordinate digital cooperation initia-

44 Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior. (2024). *Alianza Digital UE-ALC: Conectando nuestras regiones a través de una asociación digital*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EULACDigital%20Alliance_2024_FINAL_ES_0.pdf

tives and have working groups specialised in key areas, where each group is led by the most experienced RMO in the field. It would be very useful to have a shared repository where studies, projects, experiences, best practices and lessons learned can be shared and easily accessible to all actors involved.

Our region has RMOs that undoubtedly make great contributions to regional development, and in digital matters, this is no exception. As an example and according to their areas of specialisation, we can mention the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) with the capacity to carry out studies on the impact of digitalisation and develop progress indicators; or the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), which can promote the integration of digital economies and facilitate the exchange of knowledge; or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) with the capacity to carry out political coordination and representation of LAC before the EU.

The Digital Alliance as a catalyst for CELAC-EU objectives

Today, being the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) the best positioned mechanism to achieve consensus, agreement and political dialogue around regional positions and priorities, the Declaration of the EU-CELAC Summit of July 2023[45] provides an important field of action to implement the Digital Alliance for mutual benefit, as the Declaration reflects the common priorities of our bi-regional relationship. Some of these opportunities for collaboration that are already being realised or can be enhanced are:

Item 17: Cooperation in multilateral forums and digitalisation.

The need to strengthen the multilateral system and promote more effective and inclusive global governance are areas in

45 Comisión Europea. (2023, 30 de marzo). *Declaración conjunta de la Comisión Europea y los países de América Latina y el Caribe sobre el lanzamiento de la Alianza Digital UE-ALC*. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/statement_23_3892

which digital transformation plays an important role. Leveraging it can include measures to strengthen the digital ecosystem, such as the development of digital platforms and tools to facilitate the efficient sharing of knowledge and resources in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda or to facilitate more effective and democratic participation in bi-regional decision-making processes.

Item 28: EU-LAC Global Gateway investment agenda.

Channelling public funding and private capital into areas of digital transformation and infrastructure not only addresses investment gaps but has great potential to promote inclusive and sustainable digital development, aligned with the shared values of LAC and the EU. It can help address investment gaps in critical infrastructure such as data centres, broadband networks and telecommunications in general; address challenges such as the lack of technological skills, the shortage of capital for technological entrepreneurship; provide a regulatory and cooperative framework to maximise the impact of investments; and to finance capacity-building programmes that help bridge the digital divide.

Item 29: Promoting a responsible model of digital transformation.

The digital transformation must aspire to a responsible, inclusive and human- and environment-centred model that ensures that technology helps improve people's quality of life, meets their real needs and strengthens social cohesion. Under this premise and through the bi-regional scientific collaboration promoted by the EU-CELAC Research and Innovation Initiative, digital technologies and solutions are developed that are adapted to the cultural and socio-economic needs of the region, prioritising social well-being from an ethical approach to digitalisation.

Item 30: Bi-regional partnership for the local manufacture of vaccines, medicines and other health technologies.

The Digital Alliance in this area is a great tool to further strengthen the progress of the CELAC Health Self-Sufficiency Plan, for example, through the development of telemedicine platforms to make health services in remote areas more accessible to the population. They also facilitate the exchange of knowledge between professionals from both regions and are a great ally for epidemiological surveillance, rapid response to health emergencies and the resilience of health systems. Supporting programmes for the use of artificial intelligence and big data in pharmaceutical research can accelerate the local development of medicines, monitor their traceability and ensure their authenticity. Not least, advanced technologies can be implemented to produce vaccine components and medical equipment locally, reducing dependence on global supply chains.

Item 36: Citizen information and benefits of the EU-CELAC partnership.

Effective communication that enables public understanding of the objectives and achievements of this bi-regional cooperation enriches and democratises citizen participation and helps to generate trust in the institutions involved and accountability. It also encourages economic and political actors to initiate or deepen the partnership. Citizen support and legitimacy is fundamental for the success and sustainability of the Digital Alliance. Therefore, in addition to webinars, thematic forums, question and answer sessions with leaders from both regions, and similar schemes, the communication strategy can take advantage of resources that are not usually used in these mechanisms, for example it can facilitate 'virtual visits' to cooperation projects, offering stakeholders immersive experiences to the achievements of the partnership.

Items 38, 39 and 40: Peaceful settlement of disputes and mediation and peace processes.

In a regional context where political and social stability is vital for sustainable development, digital tools translate into allies to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts more effectively and lay the foundations for a more lasting peace. The Digital Alliance can provide secure platforms for dialogue, early warning systems based on artificial intelligence, and mechanisms for citizen participation that strengthen peace processes, among many other potentialities.

It also offers significant opportunities to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. Through advanced data analysis, patterns of exclusion and barriers faced by women in peace processes can be identified, enabling more inclusive strategies to be designed. Secure digital platforms facilitate the participation of women at risk or with mobility restrictions, ensuring their safety and privacy. Real-time digital monitoring tools improve the follow-up of the implementation of peace agreements, especially those related to women's rights.

By making the most of these capacities and using them ethically, the Alliance not only contributes to the achievement of specific objectives related to supporting dialogue in Haiti to overcome the crisis, peace processes in Colombia or negotiations in Venezuela, but also establishes a new paradigm of technology cooperation for building more peaceful and resilient societies throughout the Latin American and Caribbean region.

However, it is essential that these technological initiatives are implemented in an ethical manner, always considering local specificities and ensuring that technology is an enabler and not an obstacle to peacebuilding.

The Summit of the Future and the bi-regional Digital Cooperation Agenda

In its Resolution 76/307 (2022), the UN General Assembly agreed to hold the Summit of the Future in September 2024.

The convergence of objectives between the Summit and the bi-regional initiatives of LAC and the EU makes evident a shared approach towards global governance for future generations, addressing emerging challenges and reaffirming commitment to the principles of the UN Charter and the 2030 Agenda.

The Summit seeks to approve, by consensus, the action-oriented outcome document entitled "Pact for the Future," which will be accompanied by a Political Declaration and a Global Digital Compact that will provide an ideal space for both regions to collaborate in defining standards for an equitable, secure and people-centred digital world, thus enhancing their joint efforts in areas such as universal connectivity, data protection and the ethical regulation of emerging technologies.

While the negotiation process is ongoing and its outcome is still uncertain, the attention of world leaders to the broader implications of technology and the digital age is a clear indicator of the significance of the issue for the present and future of our planet; and a further opportunity for Member States to reaffirm their commitment to work constructively together to strengthen the United Nations System.

It is required to achieve results with tangible and meaningful impacts that reflect the collective vision of the United Nations for the future, thereby strengthening the UN's responsiveness to the challenges facing humanity, including in the areas of mediation, international peace and security.

The regions of Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union should advocate for concrete measures to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and youth at all levels of decision-making on peace and security. In the current Pact for the Future Draft, Heads of State and Government undertake to implement 58 specific actions. A considerable number of these actions are linked to cooperation in science, technology and innovation and, in the area of peace

and security, 17 specific actions are identified, including: "addressing the potential risks and seizing the opportunities associated with new and emerging technologies."

The Summit represents an opportunity to make progress in the governance of cyberspace and the prevention of malicious use of new technologies. As well as to continue to generate measures to mitigate and prevent an escalation or militarisation of the digital environment.

Conclusions

In conclusion, it can be said that both at the global level and in the bi-regional sphere of Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union, the digital and technological sector has become central to current and future high-level negotiations and meetings, where bi-regional cooperation in this area not only promises to strengthen economic and political ties but is also emerging as a catalyst for sustainable development and innovation in both regions.

However, there are challenges on the road to effective digital cooperation. Existing digital divides, geopolitical tensions and the emerging nature of the digital realm as a frontier for international negotiation require a careful and strategic approach. It is imperative that cooperative efforts result in tangible outcomes for the population, with priority being given to addressing disparities in digital access and skills.

In the field of conflict prevention and mediation and peace processes, technology offers both opportunities and risks. It is therefore crucial to develop a thorough understanding of how these technologies can contribute to conflict re-solution without exacerbating existing tensions and leaving no one behind.

Looking ahead, the UN Summit of the Future and the Global Digital Compact will continue to be privileged spaces for LAC and the EU to collaborate in defining global standards for an

equitable and people-centred digital world. This collaboration will not only strengthen the position of both regions in the global digital economy but will also contribute to a fairer and more sustainable international order.

The success of the bi-regional digital agenda will depend on the ability of both parties to navigate the complexities of the evolving technological landscape, maintain an open and constructive dialogue, overcome differences and translate shared visions into concrete actions for the benefit of the entire population of LAC and the EU.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION ORGANIZATIONS: EU AI ACT

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Introduction

The European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA)[47] is a key regulation for establishing a uniform legal framework in the European Union (EU) that governs the development, commercialization, implementation, and use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The regulation of AI in the EU is a rapidly evolving area, marked by the EU's commitment to leading a model of AI governance that is ethical, safe, reliable, and human-centred. This model aims to maintain

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47 Legislative Resolution of the European Parliament, dated 13 March 2024, on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonized rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain Union legislative acts (COM(2021)0206 - C9-0146/2021 - 2021/0106(COD)). Pending publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

high levels of protection for health, safety, and fundamental rights as established in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR)[48].

In this scenario, AI should serve as a tool for people with the goal of enhancing human well-being and protecting values such as democracy, the rule of law, and the environment, without creating risks or harming public interests and fundamental rights. The objective of the regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by creating a uniform legal framework for the development, commercialization, implementation, and use of AI systems in the EU.

The regulation of AI is part of a broader framework proposed by the EU Digital Decade Policy Programme for 2030[49], which aims to create better conditions for the development and use of this innovative technology. Digital transformation is the integration of digital technologies into business operations and public services, as well as the impact of these technologies on society.

Objectives of the AIA

The regulation of AI in the EU began to take shape in 2017 with various recommendations and the creation of an expert group. In 2019, the Ethical Guidelines for Trustworthy AI were published[50], highlighting the need for an ethical approach that respects human rights. In April 2021, the European Commission presented the proposal for the Artificial Intelligence Regulation, which was formally adopted by the European Parliament in March 2024 and is now in the process of being published in the Official Journal of the European Union. This regulatory framework contains 180 recitals, 113 articles, and 13 annexes.

48 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was declared in 2000 and came into force in December 2009 along with the Treaty of Lisbon.

49 Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022. Establishing the Strategic Programme for the Digital Decade for 2030.

50 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/es/library/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai#:~:tet= El%208%20de%20abril%20de,trav%C3%A9s%20de%20una%20consulta%20abierta.

The AIA has four main objectives: ensuring that AI systems in the EU market are safe and comply with existing fundamental rights legislation, facilitating investment and innovation in AI by providing a clear regulatory framework, ensuring the effective implementation of existing legislation and safety requirements for AI systems involving various actors at both national and EU levels, and promoting the legal, safe, and reliable use of AI applications while preventing market fragmentation.

To achieve these objectives, the regulation establishes a horizontal, balanced, and proportionate normative approach to AI, imposing the minimum necessary requirements to mitigate risks without hindering technological development or disproportionately increasing market costs. The legal framework is robust and flexible, with broad requirements based on principles that can endure over time.

Risk-based classification

The EU has adopted a risk-based approach, evaluating AI systems in a differentiated manner. This approach ensures that regulation is proportional to the risks presented by the systems, avoiding overly restrictive regulations for low-risk systems and guaranteeing robust protection for those that pose greater dangers. Thus, the AIA categorizes AI systems into four levels: unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal. This categorization determines the level of supervision and the requirements that developers and operators of these systems must meet.

- **Unacceptable risks (prohibited AI practices)**

AI systems with "unacceptable" risks are prohibited in EU according to Chapter II, Article 5 of the AIA. These practices are considered threats to the rights and safety of European citizens and contrary to the values of the Union.

Examples include social scoring, which is prohibited in Europe and monitors and scores citizens based on their behaviour,

violating human rights; exploitation of vulnerabilities, where AI systems that exploit vulnerabilities of specific groups such as children and people with disabilities to cause physical or psychological harm are prohibited; real-time remote biometric identification, which is prohibited in public spaces except in strictly necessary situations for significant public interest reasons such as searching for crime victims or addressing terrorist threats; subliminal manipulative techniques, where AI systems that use manipulative techniques to distort people's behaviour, harm informed decision-making, and cause significant damage are prohibited; and criminal risk assessment, where AI systems that assess the likelihood of committing a criminal offense based solely on behavioural profiles without objective human evaluation are prohibited.

These prohibitions aim to protect individuals and society from the harmful effects of digital manipulation, ensuring that AI is used ethically, transparently, and with human oversight, maintaining public trust in emerging technologies and respecting fundamental rights.

- **High-risk AI systems**

Chapter III of the AIA contains specific rules for AI systems that pose a high risk to health, safety, or fundamental rights. These high-risk AI systems are allowed in the European market provided they meet mandatory requirements and undergo ex-ante conformity assessments. An AI system is considered high-risk based on its intended purpose, as per existing product safety legislation. Classification depends not only on the function but also on the specific use and modalities of the system. High-risk AI systems must meet requirements such as risk management, technical robustness, data governance, transparency, human oversight, and cybersecurity before being marketed.

For instance, AI systems used for employment processes must be fair and non-discriminatory. In biometrics, high-risk AI in-

cludes systems for remote biometric identification, categorization based on sensitive attributes, and emotion recognition, if allowed by applicable law. Exemptions include biometric verification systems solely for identity confirmation. AI is also used in managing critical digital infrastructures, traffic, and utilities. For example, autonomous vehicles must ensure passenger and pedestrian safety, requiring rigorous testing. High-risk AI in education includes systems for determining access to educational institutions, evaluating learning outcomes, and monitoring prohibited behaviours during exams.

AI systems used to determine public assistance or social benefits are high-risk due to their significant impact on people's livelihoods and fundamental rights. Similarly, AI systems for credit scoring or assessing financial solvency are high-risk, affecting access to financial resources and essential services. High-risk AI in migration and border control affects vulnerable individuals and must be accurate, non-discriminatory, and transparent to uphold fundamental rights. Judicial AI use is high-risk, necessitating specific obligations to ensure respect for fundamental principles like the separation of powers and judicial independence.

High-risk AI systems must undergo conformity assessments before and throughout their lifecycle. Citizens can file complaints about AI systems with national authorities. Providers must document and provide assessments if they believe their AI system is not high-risk.

- **Limited-risk AI systems**

Limited-risk AI systems, or transparency-risk AI systems, are addressed in Chapter IV of the AIA, which outlines the "Transparency obligations for providers and users of certain AI systems." These systems, like chatbots and emotional recognition systems, are designed to interact with people or generate content and may pose specific risks of impersonation or

deception. They are subject to information and transparency requirements. Generative AI, such as ChatGPT, is not classified as high-risk but must comply with transparency requirements and EU copyright laws.

Providers must inform users that the content was generated by AI, and when interacting with AI systems or when their emotions or characteristics are recognized by automated means, users must be made aware of this. Providers must also design their models to avoid generating illegal content (deepfakes) and use mitigation measures. Summaries of copyrighted data used for training must be published. High-impact general-purpose AI models, like GPT-4, must undergo exhaustive evaluations and report any serious incidents to the European Commission.

The AIA's transparency obligation is a crucial step forward, but implementation is key. In summary, limited-risk AI systems must adhere to transparency and labelling requirements to ensure users are aware of their nature and functioning. This regulation is vital for protecting user rights, fostering trust in technology, and ensuring ethical and responsible AI use, contributing to a safer and more transparent digital environment for both users and developers.

- **Minimal-risk AI systems**

Minimal-risk AI systems do not pose a significant danger and are usually used for non-critical tasks. Examples include spam filters, music or movie recommendation systems, and virtual assistants. Although they are subject to fewer regulations, they must comply with basic transparency requirements and best practices, as well as existing laws such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)[51].

51 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 concerning the protection of natural persons regarding the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

Regulation and innovation

Many technology companies argue that regulation is an obstacle to innovation, but a well-crafted regulation provides legal certainty and allows all companies, whether small, medium, or large, to compete on equal terms. To address these criticisms, Chapter VI, called "Measures to Support Innovation" and Recitals 138 and following of the AIA include provisions on "Controlled Testing Spaces for AI," also known as "regulatory sandboxes." These sandboxes allow for the experimentation and adjustment of technologies in a safe and controlled environment, with the collaboration of regulators, companies of different sizes, and academics. This model facilitates constant feedback, ensuring technologies comply with regulations without stifling innovation. Member States must establish at least one national-level sandbox. These sandboxes aim promote responsible innovation and reduce regulatory barriers, accelerating the adoption of new technologies in the market.

Extraterritorial effect

The extraterritorial effects of the AIA are clearly outlined in Recital 22 and Article 2, letters "a" and "c." This means that, due to their digital nature, both AI models trained and available in the European market as well as those developed outside the EU but intended for this market. This ensures that high-risk AI systems used by European companies comply with AIA standards, regardless of their initial development location, thereby preventing the creation of "data havens." The regulation also excludes public authorities from third countries and international organizations in police and judicial cooperation, as well as AI systems for military, defence, and national security purposes. Additionally, AI systems developed for scientific research are excluded, encouraging innovation. However, it emphasizes the importance of adhering to ethical principles and data protection.

Next steps

The European Parliament adopted the Artificial Intelligence Act in March 2024[52] and the Council followed with its approval in May 2024[53].After being signed by the Presidents of the European Parliament and the Council, the legislative act will be published in the EU's Official Journal in the coming days and will enter into force twenty days after this publication.

The agreed text will be fully applicable 24 months after it comes into force. However, some of its provisions will be applicable before that period. The prohibition of AI systems that present unacceptable risks will be applicable six months after the legislation comes into force. The codes of practice will be applicable nine months after the legislation comes into force. The rules on general-purpose AI systems that need to meet transparency requirements will be applicable 12 months after the legislation comes into force. It is important to note that high-risk systems have more time to comply with the requirements, as the obligations concerning them will be applicable 36 months after the AI legislation comes into force.

Conclusion

Lawmakers globally have acknowledged the importance and urgency of regulating artificial intelligence, as the opportunities it offers are numerous, but the associated risks can be even greater. In this context, the AIA stands out as one of the most recent and complex pieces of technology regulation puzzle. By establishing comprehensive regulations, the EU seeks to ensure that AI technologies are developed and deployed in ways that are ethical, safe, and responsible. This involves setting stringent requirements for high-risk AI systems, ensuring transparency in AI operations, and safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms.

52 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240308IPR19015/artificial-intelligence-act-meps-adopt-landmark-law.

53 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/21/artificial-intelligen- ce-ai-act-council-gives-final-green-light-to-the-first-worldwide-rules-on-ai/.

Beyond its immediate impact within Europe, the AIA sets a significant precedent for global AI regulation. As AI continues to evolve and permeate various aspects of life, the EU's proactive stance provides a model that other regions can follow. By supporting a regulatory approach that prioritizes human-centric values, the EU aims to encourage other nations to adopt similar measures, fostering a more cohesive and ethical global AI ecosystem. This not only helps mitigate the risks associated with AI but also promotes international collaboration and consistency in AI standards and practices.

Finally, it is important to note that one of the most significant aspects of the AIA is that it underscores the importance of balancing innovation with regulation to promote a future where technology serves human well-being without compromising fundamental values.

DIPLOMACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION

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Introduction

The world has entered a new era: the digital era. Powerful modern technologies have permeated the contemporary world in all its dimensions, individual and social, national and international. Thus, they have also permeated the scenario in which diplomacy is forced to operate[54].

These changes not only bring hitherto unknown opportunities and challenges, but are imposing a new, as yet unregulated, universe to be regulated. The rules that governed the old system have become obsolete and useless. Against this new backdrop, three issues require our attention:

54 Kissinger, H., Schmidt, E. and Huttenlocher, D. (2021). *The Age of AI and our human future* Back Bay Books.
The authors underline the new-age status of AI's transformative power, which forces an inevitable cooperation between man and machine, imposes unprecedented social and moral challenges on humanity, and forces global governance to be addressed through international regulatory frameworks that ensure the beneficial and safe development of this technology. Whoever achieves its control will not only dominate the global economy but will be the future geopolitical and military hegemon of this new era.

1. How has this new era affected the international scene and diplomatic activity itself?
2. How can diplomacy adapt to the demands of this new era?
3. What should be the basic and primary role of diplomacy in this newly created international universe?

In any case, it must be borne in mind that international relations can only be defined as a system (international order) if they respond to a set of rules that configure it as such. Without this reference, they would be chaotic, uncontrollable and unintelligible. An unregulated order is unthinkable.

Changes on the international scene. - Three changes, among others, have had the greatest influence on the international scene.

- The first is related to the subjects and actors.
- The second refers to the nature of the issues and interests.
- The third is linked to the validity of a new digital scenario.

Regarding the first of these changes, it is clear that the Internet and social media have exponentially multiplied the actors intervening in the international sphere, diminishing the privileged protagonism that historical tradition attributed exclusively to States. Civil society organisations and movements, as well as private groups and institutions, have acquired and exert a hitherto unknown influence on States and the community of States, thereby helping shape world public opinion.

With regard to the second change, it should be noted that the constant and influential pressure from these new and diverse actors means that governments have felt compelled to accept agendas over whose elaboration and evolution they have lost their capacity for initiative and control. Globality, one of the characteristics of our era, has blurred any precise distinction

between the national and the universal, permeating the local with inevitable globality and making issues, like interests, inescapable of being subtracted from an inherent supranational dimension. Thus, most of the agendas that diplomacy in this new era is concerned with tend to be global agendas, driven by global actors.

Third, new technologies have generated virtual universes with the capacity to impose, displace and alter the real world through powerful narratives and stories that, zigzagging between reality and fiction, truth and lies, offer biased and self-serving interpretations that can favour and harm social and political interests alike.

New advantages for diplomatic activity. Like all major changes, the digital era has generated new challenges and opportunities that translate into advantages and disadvantages, benefits and detriments, also at the concrete and operational level.

One of the most immediate and practical benefits is linked to the automation of tasks. We see greater efficiency in the management of affairs, reflected in a clear reduction of time and cost, as well as better administration of public affairs.

At a deeper level, another important advantage is evident: immediate access to communication among all the various state actors has reduced geographical distances and brought functional decision-making and implementation closer together, for example, with regard to the receipt and implementation of instructions.

A similar benefit is the instant access to information at different levels of usefulness: to knowledge of facts and their different interpretations, as well as to online databases and resources, facilitating analysis and studies to support decision-making and policy development.

Through immediate and instant access to both information and communication, diplomacy can also increase levels of transparency in objective terms and to its own benefit, making decisions and positions explicit, and *public diplomacy* can find its most fertile ground here.

New disadvantages in the exercise of diplomacy. The nature of change means that benefits and advantages are inseparable from disadvantages and risks.

Thus, media intrusion has broken down the discretion and confidentiality that used to surround and protect contacts, meetings, dialogues and negotiations. Diplomatic activity, like any political activity, has been starkly exposed to the permanent scrutiny of the public and to the open criticism of national and international public opinion.

Similarly, the immediacy of information has altered time management, one of the essential aspects of traditional diplomacy. For example, in the face of any diplomatic crisis, the opportunities for subsequent information or confirmation of facts, for reflection and prudential calculation of possible consequences or alternatives have been altered by the imperative need for an instantaneous response imposed by the immediacy of information, contributing to multiplying the risks of diplomatic activity.

Finally, new technologies have brought the advantage, but also the disadvantage of dispensing with face-to-face meetings, one of the most traditional and successful forms of diplomatic activity, where the immediacy and benefits of personal contact have given way to the convenience of virtual connection (*Virtual Diplomacy*).

In short, diplomacy, exposed to permanent public scrutiny, forced to react instantaneously and operate at a distance, must simultaneously compete and cooperate with countless non-

state actors on "global-national" issues and operate in a hybrid real-virtual world.

How to accommodate diplomacy to the new era. The second question is how diplomacy can adapt to the conditions and demands imposed by the recent digital scenario, permeated by modern technologies.

To answer this question, the doctrine has turned to the most obvious, immediate and similar precedent. Thus, *science diplomacy* has inspired the first reflection on how today's *technological diplomacy* should proceed.

Indeed, scientific development, which inspired the successive industrial revolutions, is also at the root of today's revolution, which, rather than being the fourth industrial revolution, is in fact the *first technological revolution*.

This technological revolution has been accompanied by a concomitant and no less significant one, which has made it possible to move from the *Knowledge Society* to the *Information Society*.

If the most fundamental aspects of the modern *Technological Revolution* are associated with artificial intelligence and automation, the most essential features of the *Information Society* are linked to the Internet and today's social media. The interconnections between the two are profound and mutually reinforcing.

Similarly, the interrelationships of content and instruments that the theory found between s*cience* and *diplomacy* areapplicable to the interrelationships between *technology* and *diplomacy.*

As in science, there are technological aspects that are part of the natural content of diplomatic activity and aspects where the two can mutually and reciprocally enhance each other.

In conclusion, the experience of *science diplomacy* can offer a good precedent for *technological* or *digital diplomacy.*[55]

Technological or digital diplomacy and the urgency of regulating it. Having briefly referred to the most significant changes in diplomatic activity and in the international scenario and how diplomacy could adapt to these changes, following the model of *scientific diplomacy*, the third question that remains is to specify the functions of diplomatic activity in the new digital scenario.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the primary function of diplomacy in the digital age is to regulate the new technological order, yet unregulated and in the hands of large technology companies.

To begin with, it is important not to forget the obvious, which has already been mentioned: new technologies not only bring advantages and disadvantages for diplomatic activity, but also benefits and risks in all contemporary social sectors. The benefits, which are well known, insofar as they are well received and accepted, present, in principle, fewer regulatory requirements. The risks and threats, on the other hand, lead to greater demands for regulation.[56]

Thus, faced with the first regulatory dilemma of extending benefits or preventing technological risks, the prevailing opinion has been in favour of the latter: the generalisation of damages would nullify or diminish any advantageous technological use.

With this priority, regulatory reflection focused firstly on identifying potential and actual risks, and secondly on classifying them. Thus, the "quadruple level" of risks: unacceptable, high, limited and minimal determines the level of regulatory priorities.

55 Torres Jarrín, M. & Riordan, S. (2023). Science Diplomacy, Cybersecurity and Techplomacy in UE-LAC relations. Switzerland: Springer. pp. 39-47

56 Thomas M. (2024). 14 Risks and Dangers of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Builtin. https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/risks-of-artificial-intelligence

The urgent priority to regulate. The urgent priority to regulate. The complacent social enjoyment of profits and the high degree of specialisation led to regulatory inhibition on the part of States. This inhibition could only encourage the concentration of power in the hands of the big technology companies, which in turn would provoke reactions against them.

These would increase as the practical awareness grew that the use of modern technologies not only entailed serious threats and risks (disinformation, violation of personal privacy, cyber-attacks, etc.) that needed to be avoided.

The confluence of these processes prompted the need for urgent regulation. The big tech companies initially reacted by proposing self-regulation and offering to correct deviations in their own algorithms (algorithmic biases). Others argued that any regulation would impede or retard technological innovation[57]. Several argued that any attempt at regulation would be futile: regulation would always lag behind innovation.[58]

The recent emergence of generative artificial intelligence (Generative AI) prompted thousands of scientists to call for a reflexive moratorium on further innovation because of the serious dangers it could pose.[59] This initiative accelerated regulatory urgency.

Regulation at source. Regulation at source is related to algorithms. Unemotional, they can objectively and quickly analyse huge amounts of data and detect risks. This great instrumen-

57 A radically contrary view has been held by Professor James Bessen in his well-known book *The new Goliaths: How corporations use software to dominate industries, kill inno- vation and undermine regulation*. Yale University Press. 2022. The risk is not so much in slowing down innovation in the big tech companies, but rather in the brake they impose on industrial innovation and the business economy.

58 Wheeler, T. (2019). Internet capitalism pits fast technology against slow democracy. Brookings Institutions.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/internet-capitalism-pits-fast-technology-against-slow-democracy/

59 Future of Life Institute. Pause giant AI Experiments: An open letter.
https://futureoflife.org/open-letter/pause-giant-ai-experiments/

tal usefulness has led some to consider attributing regulatory competence to them.

The topic became particularly relevant after machines acquired Machine Self-Teaching capabilities, i.e. the ability to learn by themselves, without human intervention or supervision, solely on the basis of the data provided.[60]

This again reinforced the importance of regulation and the need to subject algorithms to a rigorous set of tests to ensure their safety and reliability and to avoid bias. These tests must also be complemented by regular audits and impact assessments.[61]

In conclusion, regulation at source is aimed at preventing and avoiding biases and deviations in the algorithmic structure of large technology companies.[62]

Regulation of the effects. But what happens if, despite this, there are still harmful effects on people's rights? The ultimate consequences of AI are as yet uncontrollable, but it is possible to regulate the effects that have already been observed in many areas: legal, political, social, economic, cultural and ethical.

Let us briefly review each of these:

a.- Algorithms, technical elements, are legally irresponsible, but this cannot justify irresponsibility. Legitimate rights and interests must be protected, their violation must be condemned, and damages must be compensated. Among the many rights to be respected are the right to privacy and the protection

60 ildebrand, M. (2018). Algorithmic regulation and the rule of law by Mireille Hildebrand. The Royal Society. *https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2017.0355* The author distinguishes between algorithmic code-based regulation (deterministic and predictable) and data-based regulation (statistical and unpredictable) and asks which of the two could replace or reinforce legal regulation.

61 Danesi, C. (2022). El imperio de los algoritmos. Buenos Aires: Galerna, pp. 243-258

62 Simons, J., and Dipayan, G. (2020). Why and how the algorithmic infrastructure of Facebook and Google must be regulated. The Brookings Brief. The authors argue that "*Regulating Facebook and Google as public utilities would be a decisive assertion of public power that would strengthen and energize democracy.*"

of personal data. The right to be forgotten has also received special attention from the courts, which have even dealt with the deletion of contents.[63]

b.- In the political sphere, the large technology companies, with resources that are superior in several respects to those of States, but without their representative legitimacy, constitute, due to their enormous power -still essentially unregulated- a risk even for the democratic system itself.[64] Alongside this systemic risk, there are other well-known risks associated with the new technologies, such as surveillance and control of the population or interference in electoral processes.[65]

c.- On the social side, many aspects require foresight and regulation: the risks of major job losses due to robotic automation;[66] algorithmic deviations that discriminate against certain groups;[67] or expressions on networks linked to phenomena of hatred, polarisation, confrontation, disinformation or social manipulation.[68]

d.- Fundamental economic aspects relating to demand, production, distribution, trade, consumption of goods, means and forms of payment have undergone such profound changes that they urgently

63 The Washington Post (2023). *Supreme Court tells lower courts to take another look at Texas, Florida social media laws barring platforms from deleting content*.

64 Torres Soriano, M. R. (2017). *Hackeando la democracia: operaciones de influencia en el ciberespacio*. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE). Opinion Paper 66/2017.

65 Wirtschafter, V. (2014). *Are concerns about digital disinformation and elections overblown?* Brookings, August 7, 2024.

66 Branch, W. (2024). By *2030, AI could replace three hundred million jobs globally*. Fourth Wave. Medium.
https://medium.com/fourth-wave/ai-will-push-dei-to-retool-or-perish-c58abd8a71f5

67 Daensi, C. Ibíd.

68 Rosenberg, L. (2024). *The "AI Manipulation Problem" is urgent and not being addressed.* Medium.
https://medium.com/predict/the-ai-manipulation-problem-is-urgent-and-not-being-addressed-ede0dd5e0b3e

need to be regulated to ensure consumer protection or to avoid unfair competition.[69]

e.- Cultural aspects, traditionally focused on cultural discrimination biases, have become unusually topical with multiple lawsuits against large technological companies for the use of authors‘ and artists’ works to develop “new” cultural and recreational contents in generative AI.[70]

f.- The ethical aspects, which inspire all regulation, summarise the ultimate objectives sought: safety, security, transparency, fairness and accountability, so that AI complements and does not replace human decisions, risks are eliminated or mitigated and benefits are extended.[71]

In conclusion, it is necessary to adopt and maintain a syncretic approach to regulation that includes all aspects and effects involved.[72]

Actors in the regulatory negotiation. Excluding any attempt to leave regulation at the mercy of blind, opaque and legally unaccountable algorithms, as well as self-regulation in the hands of its owners, the main and ultimate responsibility must necessarily lie with the diplomacy of States.But not only there. Regulation must include the participation of all actors involved in the different spheres.

69 Saavedra, M. (2018). ¿Romper el monopolio digital? El País. https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/10/31/opinion/1540998812_704995.html
The author already understood then that only by breaking the monopoly of the big digital companies would they be forced to abandon their unfair competition practices.

70 Dam, E. (2024). *How generative algorithms are going to shake up the music industry.* Medium.
https://medium.com/enrique-dans/how-generative-algorithms-are-going-to-shake-up-the-music-industry-add30628a91b

71 Regulatory principles, known as Asilomar, adopted in 2017, shape the most universal ethical inspirations and aspirations for the future of AI and recent technologies.

72 Turner, N. Yaraghi, N. MacCarthy, M. Wheeler, T. (2023). *Around the halls: What should be the regulation of generative AI look like?* Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/around-the-halls-what-should-the-regulation-of-genera- tive-ai-look-like/

First, technicians and experts: computer scientists, mathematicians, statisticians, software engineers, data scientists and other specialists from multi-professional teams designing algorithms must be involved in regulation. International organisations, public or private, belonging to the sectors concerned, must also be involved in regulation. Then there are the big technology companies. If regulation cannot be left to them, their collaboration is essential. Without them, any regulation would be ineffective, while their experience in implementing codes of conduct and internal regulatory protocols can be very useful. Civil society is also important. Subject to the benefits and target of the dangers of new technologies, their participation symbolises ethical concerns and collective security aspirations. But a bottom-up participatory model is not enough. The new non-state actors, although notably influential, lack the coercive authority that this regulation requires and that only states possess.[73] This is where the indispensable and central role of state diplomacy re-emerges as the main driver and coordinator of these complex negotiating processes.

Regulatory framework. Diplomacy can and should obviously operate at the domestic level. However, the global nature of our times calls for global approaches and solutions, highlighting the importance of multilateral diplomacy and the role of the international organisations, which have already demonstrated their commitment. UNESCO, the G-7, the OECD, the African Union, ASEAN, the Council of Europe and, above all, the European Union (EU) have taken important initiatives and regulatory projects. However, the global nature of the issues to be regulated and the need to convene all actors require a framework that also transcends regional or specialised international organisations. Only the UN has the inclusive and legitimate power to coordinate the necessary global approach.

73 Mazzucato, M., and Gernone, F. (2024). *Governments must shape AI's future.* Project Syndicate.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/governments-must-shape-ai-future-by-mariana-mazzucato-and-fausto-gernone-2024-04

Intergovernmental organisations can help in multiple ways, but the ultimate role of the UN is irreplaceable.[74]

However, the rivalry of the two main permanent members of the Council, the US and China, who are at loggerheads over technological hegemony, makes it difficult to achieve desirable regulation in the foreseeable future. Faced with this impasse, the European Union (EU) has taken on a leadership role in regulation.[75] But the EU lacks the technology giants that the US and China have. Only the adherence of the vast majority of countries to this initiative can make it viable. Here, the many countries of Latin America have much to say and a decisive role to play.

74 Artigas, C., Manyika, J., Bremmer, I., and Schaake, M. (2023). *What Global AI Governance Must Do*. Project Syndicate.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ai-governance-un-advisory-body-five-principles-by-ian-bremmer-et-al-2023-12

75 Vestager, M. (2024). *How to think about AI policy*. Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/europe-ai-regulation-focuses-on-uses-not-tech- nology-by-margrethe-vestager-2024-03

THE DIGITAL ALLIANCE AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DEEPENING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

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A little over a year ago, in July 2023, the III Summit between the European Union (EU) and the member countries of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was held in Brussels (Belgium). This summit will be remembered in history because it made it possible to resume the political dialogue between the Heads of State and Government of both regions, eight years after the last bi-regional meeting of this nature.[77] In this regard, it should be recalled that the II EU-CELAC Summit took place in 2015, also in the Belgian capital, and it was agreed at that time that the next summit would take place two years later.[78] However, a series of chal-

76 Director of the Chair in European Union-Latin American and Caribbean Relations at the European Institute of International Studies since March 2021. She holds a PhD in Law, specialising in International Studies, from the University of Barcelona and a post-doctoral degree from the University of Luxembourg. All websites cited in this document were last consulted on 17.7.2024.

77 Consejo de la UE, *Cumbre UE-CELAC, 17-18 julio 2023*, 7.2.2024 (última revisión), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/meetings/international-summit/2023/07/17-18/.

78 Cumbre UE-CELAC, *Declaración de Bruselas*, Bruselas, 11.6.2015, punto 77, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/meetings/international-summit/2015/06/10-11/.

lenges postponed the bi-regional meeting,[79] which finally took place in the middle of last year.

One of the most significant achievements of the III EU-EC-LAC Summit (Brussels, July 2023) was the adoption of a joint declaration in which the leaders of the EU Member States and 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC)[80] gave their support to the setting up of the EU-LAC Digital Alliance (hereinafter, DA). The official launch of this alliance had taken place a few months before the summit, in March 2023, in Bogota (Colombia), as part of the visit of the European Commission (EC) Executive Vice-President for a Digital Europe and Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, to the region. The launch event was also attended by representatives of the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU for the first half of 2023, several EU Member States and CELAC countries.[81]

Undoubtedly, the new collaborative space created by the EU-LAC DA has offered and will continue to offer an important opportunity to deepen relations between the two regions in the era of relentless digital transformation in which we find ourselves. This brief chapter aims to disseminate relevant information on this new partnership in order to contribute to such deepening. This is in line with the objectives of the Chair in EU-LAC Relations at the European Institute of International Studies, which

79 See, inter alia, Lorena Ruano, "La Unión Europea y América Latina y el Ca-ribe: breve historia de la relación birregional," *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, No. 112, January-April 2018, pp. 69-87.

80 Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. EC, *EU - Latin America and the Caribbean: Joint Declaration on a Digital Alliance,* Brussels, 17.7.2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ presscorner/detail/es/statement_23_3892.

81 CE, *Global Gateway: los socios de la UE, América Latina y el Caribe ponen en marcha en Colombia la Alianza Digital UE-ALC*, Bogotá, 14.3.2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ presscorner/detail/es/ip_23_1598.

the author chairs.[82] To that end, the chapter answers three key questions: What is the EU-LAC DA? Who is in charge of implementing the EU-LAC DA? What progress has been made in the implementation of the EU-LAC DA during the period 2023-2024? The contribution is based on documentary information, mainly from EU institutions and bodies, as well as from projects and programmes funded under the EU-LAC DA and the Global Gateway.

What is the EU-LAC Digital Alliance?

In a nutshell, the EU-LAC DA is a forum for regular dialogue and cooperation on digital issues between the two regions.[83] European, Latin American and Caribbean countries are free to join (or not). For example, at the time this paper was written, Belize was the last country to join the initiative in February 2024. Hence, the DA is seen as a rather informal strategic framework for collaboration, notable for its flexibility in design and implementation to respond to the digital challenges identified as priorities.[84]

Like EU-LAC relations as a whole,[85] the DA is characterised by the fact that it is based on a set of values and principles shared by the partner countries. In this case, this essentially includes a common vision of the digital transformation of economies and societies, which puts people at its centre. Most importantly, this implies that "[...] the design, development,

82 Among others, these objectives include (i) strengthening EU-LAC relations, (ii) protecting and promoting shared values, and (iii) promoting an inclusive digital transformation, which is based on respect for fundamental rights, including the right to privacy and personal data protection. For more information, see: https://www.ieeiweb.eu/research/reseach-activities/ue-celac-chair.

83 CE, *UE - América Latina y el Caribe, op. cit.*

84 *Ibidem.*

85 On this issue today, see CE and Alto Representante de la Unión para AsuntosExteriores y Política de Seguridad (HR/VP), *Comunicación conjunta al Parlamento Europeoy al Consejo: Una nueva agenda para las relaciones entre la UE y América Latina y el Cari-be*, Bruselas, 7.6.2023, Doc. No. JOIN (2023) 17 final.

governance and use of technology are guided by human rights and fundamental freedoms...."[86]

In particular, the EU-LAC DA aims to support the implementation of the European investment agenda in the digitalisation sector for LAC.[87] This regional agenda is part of the Global Gateway strategy, which was officially presented by the EU at the end of 2021, through a communication from the EC and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP).[88] This strategy aims to contribute to closing the global infrastructure investment gap, thus supporting economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic. To that end, the EU presents itself as a "trusted partner," offering –what it has described as– a "positive offer" of funding for infrastructure development in a number of priority sectors, including digitalisation.[89]

In this context, the Global Gateway will seek to mobilise investments of up to 300 billion euros over the period 2021-2027 at the global level.[90] Around 45 billion euros of this amount will be earmarked for LAC.[91] In addition to public funds, the European strategy seeks as a priority to raise capital from private investors. To that end, for example, the EC and the European Investment Bank (EIB) signed a guarantee agreement for up to 26.7 billion euros in 2022 under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus. This fund, which was established by the Neighbourhood, Development and International

86 CE, *UE - América Latina y el Caribe, op. cit.*

87 *Ibidem.*

88 *Comunicación conjunta al Parlamento Europeo, el Consejo, el Comité Económico y Social Europeo, el Comité de las Regiones y el Banco Europeo de Inversiones: La Pasarela Mundial*, Bruselas, 1.12.2021, Doc. No. JOIN(2021) 30 final.

89 The other priority sectors are climate and energy, transport, health, education, and research.

90 CE y HR/VP, *Comunicación conjunta al Parlamento Europeo, el Consejo, el Comité Económico y Social Europeo, el Comité de las Regiones y el Banco Europeo de Inversiones, op. cit.*, p. 2.

91 CE, *La Comisión presenta la Agenda de Inversiones de Global Gateway con América Latina y el Caribe*, Bruselas, 17.7.2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_23_3863.

Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe, 2021-2027), is the main financial arm for mobilising investments within the framework of the Global Gateway.[92]

Who is in charge of the implementation of the EU-LAC Digital Alliance?

The EU-LAC DA is a regional initiative of "Team Europa." Originally, Team Europe was established in 2020 as part of the response of the EU and its Member States to the CO- VID-19 pandemic and its global consequences. Shortly thereafter, this joint and coordinated way of working became central to the programming and implementation of EU cooperation within the framework of the NDICI-Global Europe (2021-2027).[93] At the time this paper was written, there are 169 Team Europe initiatives around the world. Most of these initiatives (i.e. 132) have been implemented with partner countries on a bilateral basis, while the rest have a global (4 initiatives) or regional (33 initiatives) scope, as is the case of the DA with LAC.[94]

It should be noted that, as a Team Europe initiative, the EU-LAC DA is implemented under a multi-level and multi-actor approach. This means that not only EU institutions and bodies, such as the EC and the EIB, are involved in its implementation, but also a group of EU Member States interested in "collaborating in the design, financing and implementation of actions to maximise European expertise and resources."[95] In the case of the DA, these Member States include, among others, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, and Portugal.[96] In addi-

92 CE, *La Comisión Europea y el BEI firman un acuerdo para facilitar nuevas inversiones en todo el mundo*, Bruselas, 10.5.2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/IP_22_2870.

93 Dirección General de Asociaciones Internacionales de la CE (DG INTPA), *Iniciativas del Equipo Europa,* Bruselas, s/f, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/team-europe-initiatives_es.

94 EU, *Team Europe Initiatives and Joint Programming Tracker,* Brussels, s/f, https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/resources/team-europe-tracker_en.

95 DG INTPA, *Iniciativas del Equipo Europa, op. cit.*

96 EU, *EU-Latin America and the Caribbean Digital Alliance: Team Europe Actors*, Brussels, s/f, https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/resources/team-europe-tracker_en.

tion, the participation of other actors, such as representatives of civil society, academia and the private sector, as well as regional development finance institutions, is foreseen.[97]

Specifically, the coordination of the implementation of the EU-LAC DA on the European side is carried out by the Digital for Development (D4D) Hub, through its regional branch for LAC launched at the end of 2021.[98] Like the DA, the D4D Hub is a Team Europe initiative, but global in scope.[99]Currently, a total of 16 Member States participate in it, with Croatia being the last to join in May 2024.[100] The D4D Hub Secretariat is based in Brussels, Belgium.[101]

In addition to the different regional branches, the activities of the D4D Hub are implemented through a number of thematic working groups and two advisory groups involving representatives from civil society and academia on the one hand, and the private sector on the other. Parties interested in joining these advisory groups can apply for membership through the D4D Hub Web site (https://d4dhub.eu/es).

The D4D Hub's counterpart in the Americas for the implementation of the EU-LAC DA is the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), which is one of the five regional commissions of the United Nations.[102] Importantly, ECLAC is also in charge of coordinating the LAC Ministerial Conferences on the Information Society, where digital policy priorities are periodically set at the regional level. The next conference is scheduled to take place in Santiago de Chile

97 DG INTPA, *Iniciativas del Equipo Europa, op. cit.*

98 D4D Hub, *EU launches the Digital for Development Hub for Latin America and the Caribbean,* Brussels, 13.12.2021, https://d4dhub.eu/es/news/eu-launches-the-digital-for-development-hub-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean.

99 El D4D Hub fue lanzado en 2020. EU, *Team Europe Initiatives and Joint Programming Tracker, op. cit.*

100 D4D Hub, *Croatia becomes 16th EU Member State to join the D4D Hub*, Brussels, 2.5.2024, https://d4dhub.eu/es/news/croatia-becomes-16th-eu-member-state-to-join-the-d4d-hub.

101 For more information, see: https://d4dhub.eu/es/who-we-are/governance/secretariat.

102 CE, *Global Gateway, op. cit.*

(Chile) in November 2024. In its context, the Digital Agenda for LAC (known as "eLAC") with a duration until 2026 will be adopted, which will replace the eLAC2024 adopted in Montevideo (Uruguay) in 2022. As a novelty, the Santiago de Chile conference will include a session dedicated exclusively to the EU-LAC DA.[103]

What progress has been made in the implementation of the EU-LAC Digital Alliance during the period 2023-2024?

During the years 2023 y 2024,[104] the implementation of the EU-LAC DA has been focused on four pillars: (i) the policy dialogue pillar, (ii) the business and innovation pillar, (iii) the connectivity pillar, and (iv) the spatial and satellite data pillar.[105]

(i) Policy dialogue

As part of the implementation of the EU-LAC DA, a series of structured dialogues are foreseen, which are open to the participation of different stakeholders from the two regions. Their purpose includes advancing the strengthening and harmonisation of regulatory frameworks and policies on digitalisation in priority topics, such as eGovernance, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, data governance and connectivity. The events held cover the following:

103 CEPAL, *Reunión Preparatoria para la Novena Conferencia Ministerial sobre Sociedad de la Información de América Latina y el Caribe*, Montevideo, 12.3.2024, https://www.cepal.org/es/eventos/reunion-preparatoria-la-novena-conferencia-ministerial-sociedad-la-informacion-america.

104 The data presented in this section includes information up to 17.7.2024.

105 EU, *Alianza Digital UE-América Latina y el Caribe,* 7.2024, p. 2, https://www.copernicuslac-chile.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/EULACDigital-Alliance_2024_FINAL_ES.pdf.

Name	Place	Date
EU-LAC DA Workshops	Cartagena de Indias (Colombia)	November 2023
High-Level Political Dialogue on Cybersecurity	Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic)	February 2024
High-Level Political Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence	Montevideo (Uruguay)	March2024
High-Level Political Dialogue on eGovernance	San José (Costa Rica)	May 2024

In addition, at least three more dialogues are expected to take place this year and before the IV EU-CELAC Summit, to be held in Colombia in 2025. Respectively, these dialogues will consider the topics of data governance (Montevideo, September/October 2024), connectivity and inclusion (Santiago de Chile, November 2024) and artificial intelligence (Santiago de Chile, November 2024). The last two dialogues mentioned will be framed within the work of the ninth LAC Ministerial Conference on the Information Society, where the aforementioned eLAC Digital Agenda 2026, referred to in the previous section of this paper, will be defined.[106]

(ii) Business and innovation

Essentially, this pillar of the DA has been developed through the implementation of the EU-LAC Digital Accelerator, which was launched in 2023. This is a project coordinated by the research and technological development centre Tecnalia (Spain), with partners such as Expertise France of the French Development Agency Group and the IDB Lab of the Inter-American Development Bank Group, just to name two examples.

106 *Ibidem*, DG INTPA, *Alianza Digital UE-ALC*, Bruselas, s/f, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/eu-latin-america-and-caribbean-digital-alliance_en.

Briefly, the objective of the Accelerator is to foster collaborations among EU and LAC corporations, start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises, through open innovation, in order to boost digital transformation in both regions. Its operation is essentially based on the provision of an online matching platform, where the aforementioned actors can register free of charge to eventually benefit from acceleration services worth up to 30,000 euros.[107] These services are granted, under certain conditions, to actors who manage to formalise a partnership commitment and have submitted their proposal to one of the calls for proposals opened by the Accelerator. These calls cover a series of "digital challenges" which, so far, have included sectors related to smart manufacturing and clean technologies.[108]

(iii) Connectivity

This pillar of the EU-LAC DA focuses on extending the cooperation originally implemented under the BELLA Programme (Building the Europe Link to Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016-2022), which resulted in the inauguration of the "Ella-Link" submarine fibre optic cable in June 2021. With an extension of 6,000 kilometres, this submarine cable interconnected the EU (from Portugal) and Latin America (from Brazil) directly for the first time.[109] In addition, the BELLA Programme contributed to extending the infrastructure of RedCLARA's terrestrial fibre optic network,[110] thus supporting the intercon-

107 For more information on these services and the special conditions applicable to the Caribbean, see: https://eulacdigitalaccelerator.com/.

108 EU-LAC Digital Accelerator, *Building bridges to accelerate Digital Transformation in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean,* s/f, https://eulacdigitalaccelerator.com/.

109 Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior, *La UE y América Latina y el Caribe se unen: un cable submarino de alta capacidad de 6 000 km colma la brecha digital entre los dos continentes,* Bruselas, 31.5.2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-and-lac-come-together-6000-km-high-capacity-submarine-cable-bridges-digital-gap-between-two_en.

110 Also known as "Cooperación Latino Americana de Redes Avanzadas." For more information, see: https://redclara.net/es/somos.

nectivity of national research and education networks in the Latin American region.[111]

In particular,[112] BELLA II aims to expand the terrestrial fibre optic infrastructure to more countries in the region, including the Caribbean. Among the new countries that will benefit from this infrastructure are Peru, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, according to the EC.[113] The programme will be in force for a period of 48 months and is coordinated by RedCLARA.[114]

(iv) Spatial and satellite data

Under this pillar of the DA, the implementation of two Regional "Copernicus" Centres for LAC has been promoted. One of them, CopernicusLAC Chile, is based in Santiago de Chile (Chile). In this case, it is an extension of the work being carried out by the University of Chile in areas such as marine and land observation in order to regionalise them,[115] providing services that include the storage, processing and distribution of satellite data from the EU's Copernicus Earth Observation Programme.[116]

The other centre, CopernicusLAC Panama, is in Panama City (Panama) and is newly created. This involves, among other things, the development of infrastructure to provide access to the free and open use of Copernicus Programme data to LAC countries,[117] including in particular those of the Central Amer-

111 BELLA II, *BELLA Programme,* s/f, https://bella-programme.eu/es/about-bella/the-bella-programme.

112 For the rest of the programme's objectives, see BELLA II, *BELLA II*, s/f, https://bella-programme.eu/es/about-bella/bella-ii.

113 DG INTPA, *Alianza Digital UE-ALC*, *op. cit.*

114 BELLA II, *BELLA II, op. cit.*

115 EARSC, *EOcafe: The EU-LAC Digital Alliance: space cooperation and upcoming opportunities* [Participation of Silvia Viceconte, Head of the Digital Sector in DG INTPA B.2], YouTube, 5.4.2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAsP4n1NEhg&t=1889s.

116 C CopernicusLAC Chile, Project, Santiago de Chile, 2024, https://www.copercus-lac-chile.eu/proyecto/.

117 EARSC, *EOcafe, op. cit.*

ican Integration System.[118] The European Space Agency and the Government of the Republic of Panama are two key partners in the development of the project.[119] According to the EU Delegation in Panama, this country "is the first in the world to sign an agreement for the establishment of a Copernicus Earth Observation Centre,"[120] which underlines the importance of EU-LAC relations.

The work of the regional centre in Panama will have a special emphasis on disaster preparedness and resilience,[121] as well as on capacity building through the transfer of knowledge and skills. To that end, the Digital Campus of the CopernicusLAC Panama centre was inaugurated in May 2024, which offers face-to-face and virtual training.[122] The first training of this centre took place in July of the same year, with the participation of representatives from almost a dozen countries.[123]

In this vein, the chapter ends on an optimistic note, reaffirming that the EU-LAC DA presents a great opportunity to deepen bi-regional relations. The challenges we face in this "digital age" are no less daunting. Not only the EU and its Member States need reliable partners to face these challenges (as they have stated on several occasions),[124] but also the LAC countries. They can offer each other a helping hand in this time of dire need.

118 EU Delegation in Panama, *Copernicus: Una mirada desde el espacio de Europay Panamá*, Panama, 28.4.2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/panam%C3%A1/co-pernicus-una-mirada-desde-el-espacio-de-europa-y-panam%C3%A1_es?s=249.

119 CopernicusLAC Panama, *Overview*, Panama, s/f, https://www.copernicus- lac-panama.eu/es/.

120 EU Delegation in Panama, *Copernicus, op. Cit.*

121 EARSC, *EOcafe, op. cit.*

122 For more information, see: https://www.copernicuslac-panama.eu/el-campus-digital/.

123 CopernicusLAC Panama, *Primera capacitación presencial del Centro Copernicus-LAC Panamá – 8-12 Julio*, Panama, 12.7.2024, https://www.copernicuslac-panama.eu/ eventos-y-formaciones/primera-capacitacion-presencial-del-centro-copernicuslac-pana- ma-8-12-julio-2/.

124 See, inter alia, CE, *Comunicación al Parlamento Europeo, al Consejo, al Comité Económico y Social Europeo y al Comité de las Regiones: Brújula Digital 2030 - El enfoque de Europa para el Decenio Digital,* Bruselas, 9.3.2021, Doc. No. COM(2021) 118 final, pp. 20-23.

EUROPEAN UNION AND CHINA IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE GLOBAL GATEWAY STRATEGY AND THE BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE

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Introduction

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region represent relevant territory at different levels. The area is characterised by its richness in commodities and having the most diverse world ecosystems. Besides these natural assets, LAC states have attractive economies, in many cases through a sophisticated domestic market. Furthermore, LAC countries are essential in guaranteeing universal food and energy security and in the fight against climate change.

Concerning food security, according to the Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Commission (CEPAL) (2024), the subcontinent possesses 15% of the land for agriculture and 11% of arable land worldwide. Additionally, it contributes to 19% of the world's agricultural products and 38% of its cattle production. Consequently, the region exports significant food products to the international market. LAC countries are attrac-

tive partners in providing these essential products to countries suffering from food insecurity.

Alongside a vibrant primary product productivity, the region holds more than 30% of the world's primary forests, meaning that the sub-continent still offers possibilities for the world's ecosystem conservation and sustainable exploitation of resources like wood and biomass. It is considered to have 40% of the ecosystems with the capacity to produce natural goods and assimilate consumption subproducts, representing a comparative advantage with other regions of the world. Six of the most biodiverse countries in the region (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) represent 24% of the world's continental ecoregions and 18% of the maritime ecoregions.

Latin America and the Caribbean boast unique water resources, holding 31% of the world's fishery surface and 8% of its protected surface. The region also possesses 32% of the world's renewable water resources and 40% of secured water places crucial for biodiversity conservation.

Concerning energy and rare earths, which are essential for a transition to green and digital economies, the LAC states also play a determining role. The region holds 47% of the lithium world reserves and 26,7% of the rare earth, producing 36,7% of the lithium available in the international market. As for hydrocarbon energy sources, 19% of the worldwide oil is a natural resource and 8,7% of the world's production. According to CEPAL's (2024) data, the region provides 11,8% of the total renewable energy in the world. Consequently, the LAC region is essential for the global actor's developing plans, including energy and economic transitions.

The availability of such resources contributed to Latin America and the Caribbean's attractiveness to other world regions and states. However, it also contributed to a high dependence on natural resources exportation, even in countries with a so-

phisticated economy such as Chile or Brazil. Hence, LAC States need further investment to modernise their economies and climb the international market production chain. Nevertheless, the region attracted foreign direct investment during the two decades of the 21st century, making it one of the most attractive regions in the world. OECD report referring to the 2010-2022 period shows Latin America and the Caribbean as the most attractive region for FDI between 2018-2022 and the second one in the period 2010-2017 when the FDI is analysed compared to the region's GDP.

As for demographic aspects, the sub-continent has low population increase rates, but it maintains a soft growth below 1% but above 0,7%. A significant percentage of the population is between 10 and 40 years old, and the middle classes in the region have been growing. Following UNCTAD (2021) results for the most prepared and receptive countries to receive vanguard technologies (including robotics, 5G, and the internet of things), we will find eight Latin American countries, headed by Brazil (0,65 – 1 most prepared; 0 less prepared), being the Colombia the last one listed (0,44). Including these countries (in decreasing order Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, Panamá, Uruguay, and Colombia) in the list signifies that the domestic market and the labour force show preparedness and capacity to develop such complex economic sectors. Regarding innovation, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) positions Brazil in the 49th position and Peru in the 76th. Between these two states, one can find Chile (52nd), Mexico (58th), Uruguay (63rd), Colombia (66th), Argentina (73rd), and Costa Rica (74th). On average, LAC stands immediately after the Asian region, so it is in second place if we consider developing areas.

However, some fragilities subsist in the framing of a regional market. Connections between the region's countries are still scarce, and interregional trade stands at 22%, one of the lowest

in the world, only surpassed by Africa, the lowest in the world (OECD, 2023). Investment in infrastructure that promotes regional connections would be a pivotal area to ensure a regional market's development. Despite the region's independence in the 19th century, some characteristics concerning the economy were maintained, including the connections to the extra-continent being more effective than the inter-regional links. Therefore, this is a crucial area for foreign investment and the development of international projects, presenting significant opportunities for growth and development in Latin American countries.

Why is Latin America and the Caribbean attractive?

As seen previously, the region is attractive due to diverse reasons, with one of the most relevant being the quantity, quality and profitability of the local natural resources. However, other factors also contribute to its attractiveness, such as a moderate population increase, a considerable and sophisticated middle class, a skilled labour force, and a friendly innovation and technology environment. This indicates the region's readiness for more sophisticated sectors, which is a promising sign for its future development. For the extra-continental foreign direct investment, one can add another characteristic, the exposure to the international market on an extra-continental basis, framed by an economic interdependence based on these extra-continental relationships.

These factors make LAC a region to be considered a global power, not only from an economic perspective but also from a geoeconomic viewpoint, mainly due to its capacity to contribute to food and energy security and for being one of the determinant eco-areas to tackle climate change and its negative consequences to the planet. In the following years, one can assume that Latin America and the Caribbean will be one of the territories where great powers compete for influence. This challenging situation can also be seen as a way for the

region to experiment with more opportunities for cooperation and engagement on international projects.

The reasons for the region's attractiveness are plentiful, but the results of future engagement depend on the capacity for diplomatic negotiation and also on the contemporary relationship with the existing global powers. Therefore, one must look at how these relationships were built, focusing on two major international actors, the European Union (EU) and China, the object of this study.

The European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean

The relationship between the European countries and the region is based on a historical past, beginning with the colonial relationship during the European Imperial period. The European governance of these territories, which resulted in independent countries integrating them into the international market, also generated a dependence on markets outside the region. Therefore, historically, the independence of these countries was between European countries. These connections exceeded the economic and political relations. The religious, cultural, and family connections have always played a relevant role between Europe and LAC countries, and they have maintained their importance until today.

Since the European Economic Community (EEC) period, Latin America and the Caribbean have received particular attention from this regional European organisation. During the Cold War, the EEC launched a mechanism for political cooperation called Intergovernmental Political Dialog, trying to balance the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union on this region and promoting human rights and democratic values through the establishment of permanent political cooperation. However, only in 1986, with the entrance of Spain and Portugal as state members of the ECC, did the LAC region receive more particular attention, including the concern about its

specificities and agenda-setting, looking to deepen the existing cooperation (Dominguez, 2018).

Throughout this relationship, the EEC and, subsequently, the EU have actively supported regional initiatives in the region, including providing technical assistance for the creation of regional integration organisations (Torres, 2017). One of the primary objectives of this support has been to foster deeper connections between the states of the region and to bolster regional resilience against international pressure from external actors. Simultaneously, there has been a noticeable establishment of closer cultural ties between the member states of the EU and the states of the region. These bilateral diplomatic relations have complemented the ties the EU was promoting. The EU and its member states have sponsored these initiatives to promote their values and political practices in the region. These objectives remain a key part of the European agenda, as the EU seeks to offer an alternative to the influence of the United States, China, and Russia in the region (Costa, Fretes Carreras, 2018).

However, the EU's support was not limited to political influence or the creation and strengthening of regional organisations. The EU has been, by far, the largest and most consistent investor in the region. The launch of the Global Gateway in the LAC region is a testament to this long-standing shared journey, as well as to the competitive environment and increased influence that came with China's launch of the Belt & Road Initiative in the region (Garcia, Arana, 2022).

China and Latin America and the Caribbean

Since the colonial Empires, the Chinese Empire connected with the LAC region, mainly through product exchange. Even before the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the First Chinese Republic, the migration of Chinese workers, known as Collies, to the most relevant ports in the LAC

region; among these, Havana stands out. These workers slowly integrated the local societies, but the Chinese communities sometimes persisted in their connection with mainland China. After the Communist Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party supported the communist parties and workers' unions with socialist inspiration in the region. Although few states recognised the People's Republic of China, Cuba, and Chile as the exception, the presence of communities of Chinese descent contributed to a silent presence in the region.

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and the People's Republic of China, and the recognition of mainland China as the country's official representative in the United Nations, LAC States began to engage with China on diplomatic and economic fronts. The rapid growth of the Chinese economy necessitated increased access to commodities, making the LAC region an attractive supplier for Chinese needs. China expanded its engagement with more LAC countries and deepened its relations. While the Belt & Road Initiative initially seemed to exclude the LAC region from a regional project connecting China to East Asia and Europe, China proposed the establishment of the China–CELAC Forum in 2014, following the model used by the European Union in its relationship with the LAC region. Despite establishing the Forum and strengthening the relationship, most LAC countries joined the Belt & Road Project between 2017-2018. By this time, the Belt & Road Initiative had already evolved into a global project, providing China with the connections necessary to maintain permanent interconnectivity for logistics (Duarte et al, 2023).

China has positioned itself as a model of success for a developing economy and an alternative to the USA, EU, or even Russia, claiming a shared identity with the Global South, of which the LAC countries are a part (Costa, 2023). Since the LAC countries participated in the Belt & Road Initiative, the

number of cooperation projects and the volume of Chinese investment in the region have been on the rise. Sectors such as infrastructure, mining, energy, and food production have received significant attention and investment from China. The model used by China in the Belt & Road Initiative appears to align with the development needs and aspirations of the LAC countries.

The new European Project – the Global Gateway

The Global Gateway seems to be an answer to the Belt & Road Initiative's success in the LAC region, although it is based on the EU's previous regional projects. Implementing the Global Gateway in the LAC region brings together 14% of the global population, 21% of the world's GDP and 60 countries. Through the Global Gateway, the EU recognises the region's relevance in areas such as renewable energy, the ecological balance of the planet, and food security, highlighting the fact that the EU is the primary investor in the region and trade relations between the two regions have increased in the last decade. EU proposed a roadmap with several actions in diverse sectors, promoting a shift in how local economies organised and targeting projects in the digital, energy, transportation, education, and health sectors for the first time. Therefore, the Global Gateway focuses on a sum of development, energetic transition, and digital transition, which would result in the EU / CELAC alliance.

The Global Gateway, however, brings some novelties, such as the sustainability factor connected to finance, environment and society, a more flexible model for financing and a market-oriented perspective that includes the private sector as a relevant partner. In the first phases, the Global Gateway gathered all the financing projects for the LAC region and gave them some orientation. Simultaneously, the global Gateway engages through a "Team Europe" system, which connects different EU sources for financing (e.g., the European Invest-

ment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)), articulating them with the member states actions. The total financing for 2021-2027 is estimated to be 300,000 million UDS.

The Chinese Global Project – Belt & Road Initiative

China maintains an extensive typology of agreements with the LAC countries, including free trade agreements (Costa Rica, Peru and Chile), bilateral agreements of investment, cooperation or sectorial (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominic Republic, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela), and agreements with multilateral organisations such as the Interamerican Bank for Development, the National Bank for Economic and Social Development of Brazil, and the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean. Thirteen LAC countries joined the Belt & Road Initiative, besides having another kind of agreement. The Chinese global project did not introduce any specific shift in China's relationship with the CELAC states; however, it contributed to deepening diplomatic relations and extending political symbolism to the existing economic relations. The model proposed by the Belt & Road Initiative is based on the principles of Chinese foreign policy, which include the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic issues. This commitment to non-interference underscores China's respect for the sovereignty of its partner countries. The financial support to the initiative is framed through non-concessional loans made by state and multilateral banks engaged in the project. The total financing for 2013-2024 was estimated at 1053 trillion USD, mainly directed toward infrastructure, mining, and energy.

Final Considerations

The Belt & Road Initiative and the Global Gateway present promising opportunities for the LAC region's development, particularly in sectors that require substantial investment. Chi-

na and the UE's continued interest in the LAC states' assets, coupled with their recognition of the urgent need to address climate change and economic transformation, especially in green energy and digitalisation sectors, bodes well for the region. The states of the region also have the potential to better integrate their economies regionally and into the international market, leveraging the investment in infrastructures that connect the diverse areas of the region and the infrastructures that link to the world. The Belt & Road Initiative's focus on building infrastructures, and the Global Gateway's emphasis on digital connections, both play a crucial role in the region's development. The LAC States can benefit from the interest of these global actors in their territories and attract investments to sectors that can accelerate their development.

However, there is a potential risk of being drawn into a competition between two global actors, each seeking to expand their international influence and continue developing their economies. In these challenging and demanding times, the need for careful analysis and diplomacy cannot be overstated. Notably, there will be a trend towards investing in innovative and technological sectors in the most developed economies of the region, potentially leading to new forms of asymmetric development. Yet, a concerted effort among the LAC countries could help balance this trend and provide a pathway for smaller countries in the region to benefit from both projects.

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OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXTERNAL SERVICES IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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Introduction

The permanent dialogue between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean (EU-LAC) and initiatives such as Global Gateway[125][125] present a high potential for optimising foreign services in the face of the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in diplomacy. The Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA) contributes to this with a series of professional academic dissemination of these topics for diplomats in the region. The following lines will address the various possibilities and opportunities, as well as some obstacles, posed to foreign services and international relations by the emergence of AI and the need to progress and adjust to the changing global environment.

125 New European strategy to boost smart, clean, and secure digital, energy and transport links, as well as health, education, and research systems around the world, at https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-poli- cy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en.

AI and its expansion

The first opportunity for a foreign service offered by AI is to understand its scope, gauge its impacts on international society and harness its benefits for diplomatic activity.

Indeed, we live in a stage of the information society that a couple of decades ago would have seemed like science fiction. In the context of the fourth industrial revolution, there has been an unstoppable cadence of technological milestones and events, from the miniaturisation of electronic components, the invention and development of mobile telephony, high-performance computers, the entry into operation of expanded language models-LLM, to the imminent advent of quantum processors, opening up the possibility of automating highly complex operations in every sector, the development of post-neuralink human-technology interfaces and other such processes. Potentially, without established governance, without cybersecurity, without control or ethical development parameters, technology could go from irruptive to disruptive[126] almost unnoticed, and we have plenty of examples of the increased vulnerability caused by the capacity for digital generation of content, its manipulation, and the potential to affect everything from electoral systems to national defence and security[127].

The ability of AI to access and analyse massive amounts of information and produce synthesised results and valuable reformulated pieces of information, limited to specific uses according to user demand, as in the case of diplomacy, in the case we are interested in, is notorious. Thus, AI tools and processes and emerging technologies applied to diplomatic uses have become powerful weapons of analysis and supply of inputs for

126 The three stages of artificial intelligence: which one are we in and why many think the third one could be fatal, at https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-65617676.

127 In this regard, Torres Jarrín (2021) warns about the changes that AI is generating in society and the urgency of addressing the vulnerabilities of human rights, due to the ethical, value and regulatory aspects, as well as cybersecurity, which raise questions about the effects of AI, as well as the actions of the private sector linked to it and its power of influence. In his article, he discusses the EU's options for ethical governance of AI.

better decision-making, thus becoming a substantive contribution to the improvement of decision-making processes in foreign policy and international relations, at all levels, national, regional and global. AI has progressed exponentially in a very short time, bursting into various fields of human relations, society and international politics, and to a great extent, is changing traditional diplomacy towards a new paradigm of e-diplomacy, digital diplomacy and cyber diplomacy (attentive to the disquisitions between diplomatic forms and practices in the digital era, related to the use of information and communication technologies in international relations[128]).

Disruptive power and transformative means - Artificial intelligence-inevitable, human intelligence-inimitable

We are witnessing processes of profound change in the international society in which AI acts as a factor of radical change and a tool for transformation. Global digital governance is necessary to strike a balance between maximising benefits and minimising risk.

Despite the undeniable benefits of AI, human contact remains fundamental in fields such as diplomacy; think of basic attributes of any approach between actors in international relations such as intuition, empathy and the ability to understand cultural variations and nuances, which are very difficult if not impossible to emulate with and by AI.

The diplomatic agent and the changing model of thinking

A major challenge facing foreign services is the ability to understand new and highly complex processes, indicators of a new global reality with inestimable projections as to the scope of the transformations it will bring about in the short term. The first diplomatic skill at stake is that of anticipation, both of what AI can offer as an opportunity and of the dangers that can surround its uncritical adoption. Blind faith in technolo-

128 SELA, 2023, p. 8-15

gy leads to technocracy and the compromise of human intelligence, surrendering to automated and distant processes in which control is lost. And a public policy area as relevant as international relations, intimately linked to principles of sovereignty, cooperation and subsidiarity, can hardly thrive and maintain the level of autonomy necessary to honour the public function it was designed to serve in the service of States and their intergovernmental systems if it succumbs to such processes. A new paradigm of digital governance is taking shape with successive regulatory approaches by leading international actors representing different legal systems (Europe, the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, among others). The basic debate is between the usefulness of technology and its socio-political neutrality[129]. Theoretically[130], this scenario has been anticipated since the 1980s, in the context of the end of the Cold War, during the height of the arms race with the potential for global confrontation due to technological advances in weapons of mass destruction and the capacity for total coverage. In order to anticipate both useful and adverse processes, the modern diplomat, more than ever, must be inspired and act based on the interpretation of the signs of the times, in accordance with the conciliar tradition of the institution whose diplomacy is the oldest still active, the Vatican.

This calls for a change of tactics, to adapt national, regional and global strategies to the new reality and to take advantage of new forms of soft power, such as political, scientific, technological and academic cooperation in the broadest fields of action, in the construction of a global technological governance.

129 Feenberg, 1991.

130 And soon, in the face of the uncontrolled development of AI, discourses in the tone of the dialectic of technological rationality, alluded to by Marcuse and Heidegger (Fischetti, 2011), could be reissued.

International comparability of capabilities - Asymmetry of starting points

Not all international actors start from the same resources and circumstances, they have different starting points. Clearly, in national and regional capacities, we see a broad lack of symmetry, with major differences between technologically and economically advanced nations and the rest of the world, which validates any approach that can be made through regional and multilateral global negotiation and coordination schemes.

Trends in technological advances, public perceptions and geopolitical dynamics have a direct impact on AI and vice versa, generating necessary spaces for cooperation in favour of system governance.

An approach to AI trends can be assessed through the results of the Stanford Institute for Human-Centred AI (HAI)'s regular and systematic survey in its AI Index Report[131]. This report makes it possible to consider the policy trends as well as the risks associated with AI and transparency issues affecting the adoption and adaptation of AI in the global economy and its correlates in public diplomacy, confirming the general perception of AI impacts, potentials and vulnerabilities (recognising that advanced AI remains under private domain), the increase in regulatory guidelines of the main systems (in particular the United States) and the transformations it is introducing in labour markets and productivity.

As for the differential in national capacities to adopt AI by different countries and thus understand their readiness needs to implement it in public services, including foreign services, this can be considered in the Government AI Readiness Index[132], prepared by the international consultancy Oxford Insights. In an interactive map, the AI readiness of 193 governments can be considered, providing an estimate of the global gover-

131 Stanford University Institute for Human-Centered AI (HAI), 2024 AI Index Report

132 Oxford Insights, Government AI Readiness Index 2023

nance landscape and regional and national political contexts. In terms of the government pillar, which encompasses foreign services, the study confirms that AI strategies are mostly coming from high-income countries, although there is a growing proliferation of AI strategies announced, launched or implemented by middle-, lower-middle- and low-income countries (with Rwanda being one of the most recent low-income countries to publish a national plan for AI). The index measures 39 indicators, across ten dimensions grouped into three pillars: government (vision, government (vision, governance and ethics, digital capability and adaptability), information and infrastructure (data representativeness, data availability and infrastructure) and technology sector (size, innovation capacity and human capital).

The International Monetary Fund also provides a comparative analysis tool in its AI Readiness Report[133], from the perspective of the future of work. The report tracks the digital infrastructure, human capital, labour policies, innovation and regulations of 174 countries. It finds how AI can increase productivity, boost economic growth, but also suppress a high number of jobs and thus increase economic and social inequality globally, demonstrating how AI is transforming and reshaping the global economy. AI's greatest constructive potential is evident in its use as a tool for increasing productivity and opening up new industries and creating differentiated jobs in those sectors. It also reveals that infrastructure and the qualification of human resources are key to harnessing AI for economic development and that national differences between countries may generate greater lags in accessing the benefits of AI for a portion of the international community.

An additional resource for assessing countries' baseline capacity to adopt and better master AI is the World Intellectual Prop-

133 IMF, Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work, 2024

erty Organisation's Global Innovation Index[134]. It considers the level of innovation performance of economies. The report is widely used by national policy makers as well as business entities in their approach to each country's innovation progress.

As we can see, there are multiple sources of qualified information available for the evaluation of the impact of AI and national, regional and global political trends, and in their cross-consideration, it is possible to appreciate the deficiencies still to be solved, such as the risks to privacy, transparency problems and biases that AI entails in its current phase of development. In addition, it is possible to consider the diverse implications of the adoption of AI in the global economy and society, presenting problems of information and polarisation, impacting with high complexity on various aspects of international relations and on the perception of processes, often permeable to public diplomacy, as well as corporate diplomacy, depending on the actors involved.

Through regional and inter-regional cooperation, progress can be made towards the equitable implementation of AI. An example of this statement is the Digital Alliance drawn up between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean in March 2023[135], which includes a Joint Declaration of Principles and Objectives signed in July of the same year[136]. This marks the largest action of the EU Global Gateway[137] towards Latin America and the Caribbean, as an initiative for inclusive, sustainable and people-centred digital transformation, based on EU digital rights and principles and the eLAC Digital Agenda 2024 (part of the New Agenda for EU-LAC Relations). Expected outcomes of such cooperation include dialogue and exchange on regulatory experiences, increased

134 WIPO, Global Innovation Index 2023

135 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/eu-latin-america-and-caribbean-digital-alliance_en

136 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_3892

137 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en

connectivity and free and secure data flows, generation of integrated innovation ecosystems and spatial services.

Challenges for foreign services

Foreign policy and IA are intertwined. In bilateral, regional and global forums, the exchange of experiences, prospective analyses and spaces for consultation and cooperation have led to an awareness of the scope of AI, the opportunities offered to foreign services by the technological tools and resources that increase their efficiency, as well as the approach to aspects related to regulatory frameworks, best practices and singularities that AI deserves according to each environment or ecosystem of implementation and regulatory environment (according to geopolitical, economic and corporate parameters), emerge. With regard to regulatory aspects, we will briefly mention that there are different approaches as to the need to regulate and on what parameters, as well as the industry's self-management mechanisms. Thus, there are references to initiatives in the European Union (aimed at regulating and focusing on AI risk levels), the United States of America (which has established guidelines for the supervision of the sector's self-management) and the position of the People's Republic of China (which is looking at the development of the AI industry). Each is trying to provide answers in its own field to issues of cybersecurity, data and content regulation, privacy, intellectual property, among others.

The various foreign services have varying degrees of readiness to implement AI in their functions, but they all share a common concern about the ethical aspects of AI, its impact on international relations and the effects of technology-based services. In this regard, it is worth recalling the efforts being made at the multilateral level, in the exercise of cyber diplomacy, mainly in the sphere of UNESCO and its commitment since 2021 to promote a global standard on the ethics of artificial in-

telligence (framework adopted on 23 November 2021 by 193 Member States[138]). This proposed global standard is based on values and principles (around the protection of human rights and dignity, with transparency and fairness as guiding elements, as well as human oversight of AI systems) and sets out its application in 11 policy areas, including administration and governance, information policy, international development and cooperation, economics and labour. This area has been refined and two global forums on AI ethics and governance have already been developed[139].

We assume that just as in the evolution of national law, which accompanies and follows the facts, in international law, provisions and normative frameworks that update and reshape both public and private international law will be progressively incorporated. It will also be the task of cyber diplomacy and specialised bodies of multilateralism to advance in this process. As can be seen, it will not only be a process of regulating artificial intelligence in one way or another, but of how it will shape national and international normative systems per se[140]. Think of the alternatives offered by AI in procedural law and international commercial law, such as the adoption of tokenised identity and authenticity verification mechanisms based on blockchain technology. This is already a reality, and value certificates are even issued in the form of real estate titles and others[141].

Opportunities for diplomatic services

We note with interest the many actions that, based on digital tools, many of them AI-specific, facilitate regular diplomatic life. For example, systems for the intelligent recording of

138 UNESCO, Recomendación sobre la ética de la inteligencia artificial, 2022

139 https://www.unesco.org/es/artificial-intelligence/recommendation-ethics

140 Drnas de Clément, 2022.

141 https://www.infocampo.com.ar/las-inversiones-del-campo-al-alcance-de-un-clic-como - invertir-en-tierras-con-un-token/

meetings, the preparation of reports and summaries, profiles and statistical systematisation for promotional activities, negotiations and presentations in specialised circles. In addition, geolocation services, data linking, use of algorithms for big-data processing in diplomatic and consular functions, and so on. Here we see the developments in digital diplomacy and the need to promote the adoption of AI by ministries and administrations of foreign services -both in infrastructures and in the training of civil servants- in order to enhance their functions. A progressive escalation can be anticipated, almost without limits (or those that technology and its ethical use impose), which will position and give greater success to those best prepared to take technology to the "bottom of the diplomatic DNA"[142], far beyond digital public diplomacy, not attacking, but strengthening the essence of the function.

Examples of digital services with greater potential for application to diplomacy include translation and interpretation, which support many diplomatic and consular functions, facilitating communication and ensuring the fidelity of interpretation between parties.

Particularly in consular matters, applied AI can allow both the attention to users through virtual interaction mechanisms (such as the so-called digital personality recently implemented by Ukraine[143] in these services) and the adoption of digital document management strategies such as the e-apostille or electronic apostille (which implies the replacement of the holographic signature and personal interventions by digital intervention mechanisms and automated processes, with international security certificates, following e-APP protocols[144]).

142 Bjola, 2018.

143 https://mfa.gov.ua/es/news/mzs-ukrayini-priznachilo-cifrovu-osobu-dlya-informuvannya-shchodo-konsulskih-pitan

144 https://www.hcch.net/es/instruments/conventions/specialised-sections/apostille/e-app-notifications

In virtual collaborative spaces, where tools and working documents are developed among parties, technology is welcome to support the core function. The use of videoconferencing and working mechanisms in virtual spaces during the 2020-2022 global pandemic was a good example of this. It is also true that the most important negotiations and consultations on the most sensitive issues had to be held in person or even postponed until after the pandemic to allow parties to interact in a traditional way, as seen in many international fora and especially in regional and bilateral contexts.

In digital public diplomacy, it is possible to constantly monitor opinions and actions on social networks, as well as in the press and other local and international communications, so that after analysis according to pre-established parameters, the professional can be offered the most appropriate communication strategies -and even ready-made information pieces- oriented according to public perceptions and adjusted to the foreign policy communication strategy.

Well-systematised information, provided in real time to foreign service officials, can allow for greater efficiency in dealing with concrete cases, especially if, based on AI, they can be provided with internal consultation services and coordination with support teams, specialised in information on international, diplomatic and consular law, financial, economic and governmental, administrative and consular affairs.

Likewise, the promotion and dissemination of image, values and policies at the international level, as functions of public diplomacy, can benefit from AI in the design of campaigns, personalisation of messages, optimisation of communication strategies and segmentation of markets or communication objectives, according to available resources. AI tools enable the analysis of large volumes of complex demographic and behavioural information to appropriately target campaigns.

AI applied to data analysis for decision-making is a remarkable chapter in the use of technology in diplomacy. Foreign services can use AI to address large volumes of information and produce reports and briefing pieces for specific processes, where the interpretation of trends and patterns can influence policy formulation and anticipatory capacity.

In crisis management, applied AI has proven to be highly useful in detecting crisis situations, triage, priority assessment and efficient allocation of available diplomatic and consular resources in real time, in connection with other public services and in communication with international counterparts. Many Ministries of Foreign Affairs have crisis units or emergency response and management centres (Spain, France, Italy and many others, also in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Uruguay). Many of them have automated processes based on AI, allowing for a faster response and adequate coordination of services, alerting diplomats of the processes to be undertaken with threat assessment and more urgent actions, whether in emergencies caused by natural disasters, accidents or conflicts of various kinds.

AI can mean greater deployment agility and efficiency in humanitarian actions and special missions, favouring immediate responses to global processes, such as crises generated by uncontrolled human mobility, security emergencies, catastrophes and other emerging situations of danger or violence, as well as health emergencies (clearly evidenced in pandemics). AI, which links geolocation systems, communications, information analysis and tailored solutions, can make the difference for officials and users in times of high tension.

Moreover, for negotiations, crisis management and conflict resolution, AI can assist foreign services in providing detailed analyses and simulations of alternative scenarios, allowing them to evaluate different strategies and anticipate optimal

solutions. Simulation models (widely used in the military) have their applications in predicting the behaviour of other actors in a negotiation, crisis or dispute, allowing the evaluation of performance parameters, foreseeing changes in action scenarios and facilitating the adoption of better informed decisions, thus achieving better results, according to previously outlined objectives. This results in a more efficient and effective diplomacy.

Simulation can also be applied to the field of training and human resource development in foreign service. There are a number of AI-driven learning platforms that are able to provide customised training programmes, tailored to the characteristics of the staff members and their individual needs. These strategies significantly improve the efficiency of learning and ensure better preparation of personnel to face the challenges of their activity (especially in the case of countries with limited human and material resources, whose officials face multiple challenges, and the success of their management depends more on their multi-functionality and versatility than on their high level of specialisation in specific issues).

AI can also strengthen the security and cybersecurity of processes, based on algorithms that can detect and prevent cyberattacks and other vulnerabilities in information and communication systems, protecting the diplomatic and consular function and ensuring the provision of services. In addition, capabilities can be developed to prevent threats before they materialise by identifying suspicious patterns of behaviour through AI.

There are many other uses of technology in the service of diplomatic productivity, although some have limits. Such is the case with negotiation. As mentioned above, there may be various devices, tools and systems to support the diplomatic function in negotiation, but there are limits to digital efficiency in negotiation and deal-making, as personal interaction remains

irreplaceable for reasons of trust and confidence, flexibility, adaptability and other variables that cannot be digitally addressed in the practice of negotiation (especially the human capacity for persuasion, intuition, empathy and moderation).

Other functions to be strengthened through AI are the management of regional and international initiatives through virtual platforms, as in the case of coordinating actions to facilitate the movement of cargo and high season movements of civilians and goods, grouping and reinforcing intervention services at critical points of movement and integrated logistics. In some cases, this involves accompanying consular services and integrating document control services at border posts or logistical interfaces (airports and ports).

Conclusions

In conclusion, we can assume that AI offers numerous opportunities to improve the productivity of foreign services and to optimise diplomatic and consular processes, making them more efficient, secure and cybersecure, always under expert supervision, i.e. human and guided by internationally accepted values and principles. At the same time, the adoption of AI solutions presents ethical and regulatory challenges, many still to be addressed, if their responsible and beneficial use is to be ensured. The international collaboration schemes currently underway offer a response in this regard, together with the exchange of best practices and the evident consensus on appealing to a global governance system[145] and eventually con-

145 This is the guideline for broad multi-level processes on cross-cutting issues (environment, education, peace and security, infrastructure, among others). The UN Secretary-General himself has proposed a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation, monitored by the Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy for Technology. There is interest in opening spaces for multilateral dialogue, as recently expressed by the UN General Assembly in several instances when referring to AI, as well as in the process initiated by the UN Secretary General towards a Summit of the Future, to be held in September 2024 and aimed at digital inclusion and effective coordination in today's fragmented international context. It is expected that at this Summit, as a multilateral platform, a Global Digital Compact can be agreed, as well as general guidelines on digital governance to be included in the Summit declarations and covenants.

verging towards the compatibility of regulatory practices and, in the future, a general binding framework for both public and private actors.

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